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Summary  findings
Beck, Demirgiu,-Kunt,  Levine, and Maksimovic explore  *  Financial structure is not an analytically useful way
the relationship between financial structure-the  degree  to distinguish financial systems.
to which a financial system is market- or bank-based-  *  Financial structure does not help us understand
and economic development.  economic growth, industrial performance, or firm
They use three methodologies:  expansion.
* The cross-country approach uses cross-country data  *  The results are inconsistent with both market-based
to assess whether economies grow faster with market- or  and bank-based views.
bank-based systems.  In other words, economies do not grow faster,
* The industry approach uses a country-industry panel  industries dependent on external financing do not
to assess whether industries that depend heavily on  expand faster, new firms are not created more easily,
external financing grow faster in market- or bank-based  firms' access to external finance is not greater, and firms
financial systems and whether financial structure  do not grow faster in either market- or bank-based
influences the rate at which new firms are created.  financial systems.
*. The firm-level approach uses firm-level data across a  The authors find overwhelming evidence that the
broad selection of countries to test whether firms are  overall level of financial development and the legal
more likely to grow beyond the rate predicted by internal  environment in which financial intermediaries and
resources and short-term borrowings in market- or bank-  markets operate critically influence economic
based financial systems.  development.
The cross-country regressions, the industry panel
estimations, and the firm-level analyses  provide
remarkably consistent conclusions:
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In Raymond  W. Goldsmith's seminal book, "Financial  Structure and Development,"  he
defined "financial structure" as the mixture of financial instruments, markets, and institutions
operating in an economy. He sought to (1) trace the evolution of national financial system's
during the process of economic development, (2) assess whether the overall development of the
financial system influences the rate of economic growth, and (3) evaluate the impact of financial
structure on the pace of economic  development. Goldsmith  was largely successful in
documenting  the evolution of national financial systems, particularly the evolution of flnancial
intermediaries. Goldsmith met with more limited success in assessing the links between the
level of financial development and economic growth. He clearly documented a positive
correlation between financial and economic development  across a large number of countries. He
just as clearly indicated that he was unwilling to draw causal interpretations from his graphical
presentations.'  More recent work, however, has provided additional information  on the finance-
growth nexus and has offered a much bolder appraisal:  firm-level, industry-level,  and cross-
country studies all suggest that the level of financial development  exerts a large, positive impact
on economic  growth. 2 On the third question - the relationship between financial structure and
economic development, Goldsmith  was unable to provide much cross-country evidence due to
1 Moreover,  Goldsmith lucidly described the multifaceted channels linking financial and economic development.
2 Specifically,  firm-level studies [Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic 1998, 1999], industry-level  studies [Rajan and
Zingales 1998; Wurgier 2000], country-case  studies [Cameron,  Crisp, Patrick and Tily  1967;  McKinnon 1973;
Haber 1991, 19971,  time-series studies [Neusser  and Kugler 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel 19981,  cross-country
studies [King and Levine 1993a,b;  Levine and Zervos 1998],  cross-country instrumental variable studies [Levine
1998, 1999; Levine 2000b] and pooled cross-country,  timer-series studies [Beck and Levine 2000b; Beck, Levine,
and Loayza 2000; Levine, Loayza,  and Beck 2000; Rousseau and Wachtel 2000] find that the level of financial
development is positively related to growth and this relationship is not due only to simultaneity bias. Note,
however, that these findings do not reject the hypothesis that economic activity influences financial development.
The findings merely suggest that there is an exogenous component of financial development that positively
influences economic activity, such that the strong positive  relationship between the level of financial development
and economic  growth is not only due to economic activity's influence on financial development.
1data  limitations.  Instead,  Goldsmith  - like  many  researchers  before  and after  him - relied  on
careful  comparisons  of Germany  and  the United  Kingdom.
In examining  financial  structure  and  development,  historians,  economists,  and
policymakers  have  examined  the relative  merits  of bank-based  versus  market-based  financial
systems. For over  a century,  this  work  primarily  involved  careful  country  studies  of Germany
and  Japan  as bank-based  systems  and the United  States  and  the United  Kingdom  as market-based
systems. As  summarized  by Allen  and Gale (1999)  and Stulz (2000),  this research  has produce
enormously  valuable  information  on these  financial  systems. The limited  sample,  however,
limits  the generality  of the inferences  that historians,  economists,  and policymakers  can draw.
The four  countries  have  very similar  long-run  growth  rates,  so that it is difficult  to correlate
differences  in financial  structure  with differences  in long-run  growth  rates. In this  paper,  we
return  to Goldsmith's  (1969)  objective  of examining  the relationship  between  financial  structure
and  economic  growth  using  broad  cross-country  comparisons.
This paper  evaluates  the impact  of financial  structure  on economic  growth  using  the large
international  dataset  constructed  by Beck,  Demirgiiu-Kunt,  and Levine  (2000). We use (i) firm-
level  analyses  on 33 countries,  (ii)  industry-level  studies  on 34 countries,  and (iii)  country  level
investigations  of 48 countries.  Thus,  we use an assortment  of different  datasets  and econometric
methodologies  to assess  the relationship  between  financial  structure  and  economic  development.
In this way,  we contribute  to a century  long debate  and start  to tie together  some  long  dangling
loose  ends  from Goldsmith's  (1969)  influential  work.
From  an economic  theory  perspective,  the paper  examines  four  alternative  views  on
financial  structure.  The bank-based  view  highlights  the positive  role of bank in mobilizing
resource,  identifying  good  projects,  monitoring  managers,  and managing  risk [Levine  1997,
22000b]. The  bank-based  view  also highlights  the comparative  shortcomings  of market-based
systems. Specifically,  well-developed  markets  quickly  reveal  information  in public  markets,
which  reduces  the incentives  for individual  investors  to acquire  information.  Thus, greater
market  development  may  impede  incentives  for identifying  innovative  projects  and thereby
hinder  efficient  resource  allocation  [Stiglitz  1985;  Boot,  Greenbaum,  and Thakor  19931.
Proponents  of the bank-based  view  also stress  that  liquid  markets  create  a myopic  investor
climate  [Bhide  1993]. In liquid  markets,  investors  can inexpensively  sell their  shares,  so that
they  have  fewer  incentives  to monitor  managers  rigorously.  Thus,  greater  market  development
may  hinder  corporate  control  and  national  productivity.  Moreover,  Gerschenkron  (1962)  and
others  have  argued  that  banks  have  advantages  over  markets  in most institutional  environments.
Specifically,  even  in countries  with  weak  legal and  accounting  systems  and  frail institutions,
powerful  banks  can still force  firms  to reveal  information  and pay their debts,  thereby  facilitating
industrial  expansion  [Rajan  and Zingales  19991.  From  these  vantage  points,  market-based
systems  may  be less  effective  than  bank-based  systems  in allocating  capital  to new, innovative
firms.
The market-based  view  highlights  the positive  role of markets  in promoting  economic
success  [Beck  and Levine  2000a]. In particular,  markets  facilitate  diversification  and  the
customization  of risk management  devices. Furthermore,  proponents  of the market-based  view
stress  deficiencies  in bank-based  systems.  First,  by acquiring  expensive  information  about
enterprises,  banks  can extract  large  rents  from firms. This reduces  the incentives  for firms  to
undertake  high-risk,  high-return  projects  because  firms  will lose  an excessively  large  proportion
of the potential  profits  to banks [Rajan  19921.  Second,  since  banks  make loans,  they  have  an
inherent  bias  toward  low-risk,  and  therefore,  low-return  projects.  Thus, bank-based  systems  may
3retard innovation  and growth  [Morck  and  Nakamura  1999;  Weinstein  and Yafeh 19981.
Furthermore,  powerful  banks  may collude  with firm  managers  against  other investors,  which
stymies  competition,  effective  corporate  control,  the emergence  of new firms,  and economic
growth  [Hellwig  19981.  Thus,  proponents  of the market-based  view stress  that markets  will
reduce  the inherent  inefficiencies  associated  with banks  and enhance  economic  development.
The law and  finance view  is the third  perspective  on the relationship  between  financial
structure  and economic  development.  La Porta  et al (2000,  henceforth  LLSV)  recently  rejected
the entire  bank-based  versus market-based  debate. They  instead  argue that  the legal system  is
the primary  determinant  of the effectiveness  of the financial  system  in facilitating  innovation  and
growth. Thus,  the law and finance  view  predicts  that financial  structure  will be unrelated  to new
firm  formation  and economic  growth. Instead,  the law and finance  view conjectures  that  the
efficiency  of the legal system  will be positively  related  to innovation  and growth.
Finally,  the financial  services  view  stresses  that financial  systems  provide  key financial
services. These  financial  services  are crucial  for firm  creation,  industrial  expansion,  and
economic  growth. The division  between  banks and markets  in providing  these  services,
however,  is of secondary  importance.  Thus,  the financial  services  view predicts  that  overall
financial  development  is important  for economic  development,  but financial  structure,  per se,
will not add much  to our understanding  of the process  of economic  development.
4This paper  examines  six specific  questions.
1.  Do countries  with bank-based  financial  systems  grow  faster  than countries  with market-
based  systems,  or is financial  structure  unrelated  to the pace of economic  development?
2.  Does  the legal system  facilitate  economic  growth  by exerting  a major impact  on the
overall  effectiveness  of the financial  system?
3.  Do industries  that depend  heavily  on external  finance  grow  faster and/or  is new  firm
formation  more  likely  in bank-based  or market-based  financial  systems?
4.  Does  the legal system  importantly  influence  the availability  of external  finance  and  the
rate  of new  firm creation?
5.  Do firms  in bank-based  system  have  greater  access  to external  financing  and  grow  faster
than  firms  in market-based  financial  systems?
6.  Does  the component  of the financial  system  that  is defined  by the legal environment
influence  firm  performance?
To assess  the first two questions,  we use standard  cross-country  growth  regressions.  We
average  data over the period 1980-95  and assess  whether  financial  structure,  i.e., the degree  to
which  the country  is bank-based  or market-based  influences  economic  growth. An alternative
hypothesis  - the financial  services  view - suggests  that the level of overall  financial  development
influences  growth,  but not financial  structure  per se. Finally,  the law and finance  view stresses
the role of the legal  system  in facilitating  financial  arrangements  and growth.
To explore  the impact  of financial  development  and structure  on industry  growth  and new
firm creation,  we will use a country-industry  panel.  Building  on work by Rajan and Zingales
(1998),  we will test whether  industries  that  depend  more  heavily  on external  finance,  grow  faster
in market-  or bank-based  financial  systems,  or whether  the overall  level of financial  development
and the component  explained  by the legal system  explain  cross-industry  growth  patterns.
Decomposing  industry  growth  into the growth  in new  firms and  the average  size of firms,  we
5will test the relevance  of the bank-based,  market-based,  financial  services,  and legal  and finance
views  for understanding  the creation  of new firms.
To answer  the last two  questions,  we will use firm-level  data  to compute  the growth  rates  of
firms  as predicted  by their internally  available  funds  and short-term  borrowings.  We then
examine  whether  the proportion  of firms  that  grow  faster than  predicted  is higher  in market-or
bank-based  financial  systems,  or whether  the overall  level  of financial  development  and the legal
rights  of outside  investors  and their  enforcement  explain  firms' growth  across  countries  and  over
time.
Remarkably,  country-level,  industry-level,  and firm-level  investigations  all tell the same
story:  the data provide  no evidence  for the bank-based  or market  based  views. Distinguishing
countries  by financial  structure  does not help  in explaining  cross-country  differences  in long-run
GDP  growth,  industrial  performance,  new firm  formation,  firm  use of external  funds,  or firm
growth. Moreover,  the component  of financial  development  explained  by the legal rights  of
outside  investors  and the efficiency  of the legal  system  in enforcing  those  legal rights  is strongly
and  positively  linked  with GDP  growth,  industrial  performance,  new firm  formation,  and firm
growth. The legal system  importantly  influences  financial  sector  development  and this in turn
influences  firm  performance,  the formation  of new  firms,  and national  growth  rates.
Our results  are thus consistent  with the financial-services  and the law and finance  views.
While  the overall  level of financial  development  and the efficiency  of the legal  system  in
protecting  outside  investors'  rights  are associated  with higher growth  rates and access  to long-
term finance,  the distinction  between  market-  and bank-based  systems  does not offer any
additional  information.  Our findings  suggest  a valuable  policy  message. Instead  of focusing  on
6the composition  of the financial  system,  policy  makers  should  instead  focus on strengthening  the
rights  of outside  investors  and enhancing  the efficiency  of contract  enforcement.
This paper  summarizes  and  extends  three  recent  papers  on financial  structure. Levine
(2000b)  shows  that financial  structure  is not a good  predictor  of real per capita GDP  growth  in a
cross-country  growth  framework:  neither  bank-based  nor market-based  financial  systems  are
closely  associated  with economic  growth. He also  finds that  financial  structure  is not a good
predictor  of capital  accumulation,  productivity  growth  and savings  rates. Levine  (2000b)  also
finds  strong  support  for the law and finance  view of financial  structure. Beck  and Levine
(2000a)  show  in a country-industry  panel that  financially  dependent  industries  do not grow  faster
in bank-  or market-based  financial  systems.  The creation  of new firms  does also not  vary
systematically  with financial  structure. Demirguc,-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (2000)  use firm-level
data  and show  that financial  structure  is not a robust  predictor  of the proportion  of firms  that
grow  faster  than  predicted  by their  own  internal  resources  and short-term  borrowings.  While
each of these  papers  explores  only one aspect  of the potential  relationship  between  financial
structure  and  economic  development,  our paper  explores  these three  different  aggregation  levels
under  a unified  framework.  Specifically,  we use (i) a consistent  sample  of countries,  (ii)  a
consistent  array  of financial  structure  and financial  development  indicators  for the cross-country,
industry-level  and  firm-level  estimations,  and (iii)  and consistent  instrumental  variables  across
the different  datasets  and econometric  specifications.  Since  we find results  consistent  with these
papers,  this serves  as a robustness  check  and also provides  a comprehensive  presentation  of the
firms,  industry,  and cross-country  results  on financial  structure  in as unified  a framework  as
possible.3
3There  are, of course,  some  costs  associated  with  developing  this unified  approach. The underlying  papers  perform
more  sensitivity  analyses  and  robustness  checks  than we  present  in this synthesis.
7The remainder  of the paper is organized  as follows.  Section  2 describes  our indicators  of
financial  development,  financial  structure  and the legal system.  Section  3 explores  the impact  of
financial  structure  on cross-country  growth. Section  4 examines  our four hypotheses  in a
country-industry  panel. Section  5 explores  whether  firms' access  to external  resources  differs
across  financial  systems  with different  structures.  Section  6 concludes.
2. Indicators of Financial Development  and Structure and the Legal
System
This section  presents  the indicators  of financial  development,  financial  structure  and  the
legal  system  that  we will use in the cross-country,  industry-level  and firm-level  analysis. We
will discuss  data  that are specific  to one aggregation  level in the respective  section.  Table 1
presents  descriptive  statistics  and the correlation  between  the different  indicators.  Table  Al
presents  the different  indicators  for all 48 countries  in our sample,  with data being  averaged  over
the period 1980-95.
2.1 Indicators  of Financial  Development
To assess  the efficiency  with which  financial  intermediaries  and markets (i) assess  new
projects  and firms, (ii)  exert corporate  control,  (iii)  ease risk  management  and (iv)  mobilize
savings,  we need  appropriate  indicators.  While  the perfect  measures  certainly  do not exist,  the
recent  literature  has developed  indicators  that proxy  relatively  well for financial  intermediary  and
stock  market  development  across  countries.  We use newly  constructed  data  in Beck,  Demirguc  -
Kunt, and  Levine (2000)  to measure  overall  financial  development.  While  previous  work has
8focused  on either  financial  intermediary  or stock  market  development,  the indicators  used in this
paper  combine  banks and  stock  markets  into one indicator.  While  this does  not control  for the
fact  that banks  and stock  markets  might  impact  economic  growth  through  different  channels,  as
found  by Levine  and Zervos (1998)  and Demirgu,c-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1998),  it helps  us
distinguish  more  clearly  between  the effects  of financial  development  as opposed  to financial
structure.
Our preferred  measure  is Finance-Activity,  a measure  of the overall  activity  of the
financial  intermediaries  and markets. It is defined  as the log of the product  of Private  Credit,  the
value  of credits  by financial  intermediaries  to the private  sector  divided  by GDP,  and Value
Traded,  the value of total shares  traded  on the stock  market  exchange  divided  by GDP. Private
Credit  is the most  comprehensive  indicator  of the activity  of financial  intermediaries  by
including  both bank and nonbank  intermediaries.  Recent  work  shows  that Private  Credit  exerts  a
large, positive,  robust  influence  on economic  growth  [Levine,  Loayza,  and Beck  2000;  and Beck,
Levine,  and Loayza  2000].  Value  Traded  measures  the activity  of the stock  market  trading
volume  as a share  of national  output  and thus  indicates  the degree  of liquidity  that  stock  markets
provide  to economic  agents. 4 Levine  and Zervos  (1998)  show  that Value  Traded  is a robust
predictor  of long-run  economic  growth.
To test the robustness  of our results,  we will use several  alternative  measures  of financial
development.  Finance-Size  is a measure  of the overall  size of the financial  sector and  is defined
as the log of the sum of Private  Credit  and Market  Capitalization.  Market  Capitalization  is
defined  as the value of listed  shares  divided  by GDP,  and is a measure  of the size of stock
4Levine  and  Zervos  (1998)  point  out a potential  pitfall  of Value  Traded.  If forward-looking  stock  markets  anticipate
large  corporate  profits  and therefore  higher  economic  growth,  this  will boost  stock  prices  and therefore  boost  Value
Traded. However,  when  we use  the turnover  ratio,  which  equals  value  traded  divided  by market  capitalization,  we
9markets  relative  to the economy. While  we include  this in our analysis,  past work  suggests  that
market  capitalization  is not  a very good  predictor  of economic  performance  [Levine  and  Zervos
1998].
Finance-Efficiency  measures  the efficiency  of financial  intermediaries  and markets  and  is
defined  as the log of ratio of Value  Traded  and Overhead  Costs,  which  equals  the overhead  costs
of the banking  system  relative  to banking  system  assets.  While  subject  to interpretational
problems,  large  overhead  costs  may  reflect  inefficiencies  in the banking  system  and therefore
proxy  as a negative  indicator  of banking  sector  inefficiency.
Finance-Aggregate  combines  the previous  three  measures  and is thus  a conglomerate
indicator  of the size,  activity  and efficiency  of the financial  sector. Specifically,  it is the first
principal  component  of Finance-Activity,  Finance-Size  and Finance-Efficiency.
Finance-Dummy  isolates  countries  that  have  both underdeveloped  financial
intermediaries  and markets.  Specifically,  it equals  zero  if both  Private  Credit  and  Value  Traded
are less than  the sample  mean  and one  otherwise.
Our indicators  of financial  development  exhibit  a large  variation  across  different
countries,  as can be seen from  Table  1.  Switzerland  has the highest  value  for Finance-Activity,
with Value  Traded  at 98%  of GDP  and Private  Credit  at 178%  of GDP.  Ghana,  on the other
hand,  has the lowest  value  for Finance-Activity,  with Value  Traded  being  0.4%  of GDP  and
Private  Credit  3% of GDP. All measures  of financial  development  are correlated  with each  other
at the 1% level.
get similar results. Turnover does not suffer from this price effect because stock prices enter into the numerator and
denomninator.
102.2.  Indicators  of Financial  Structure
We also construct  measures  of the degree  to which  each country  has a market-  or bank-
based  financial  system. Since  there  is not a single  accepted  definition  of financial  structure,  we
use an assortment  of different  measures  to test the robustness  of our results. We present  the
results  on five measures  of financial  structure.  Each  of these  measures  is constructed  so that
higher  values  indicate  more  market-based  financial  systems.  Demirgii-Kunt  and  Levine  (1999)
examine  the relationship  between  financial  structure  and  a variety  of economic,  legal  and
regulatory  variables.  Along  with many  findings,  they  note  that  higher  income  countries  tend  to
have  more  market-oriented  financial  systems.
Our preferred  indicator  of financial  structure  is Structure-Activity,  which  indicates  the
activity  of stock  markets  relative  to the activity  of banks  and is defined  as the log of the ratio  of
Value  Traded  and  Bank  Credit. Bank  Credit  equals  the claims  of the banking  sector  on the
private  sector  as a share  of GDP. Compared  to Private  Credit,  we exclude  claims  of nonbank
financial  intermediaries  to thus  focus  on the  commercial  banking  sector.
We construct  several  alternative  measures  of financial  structure,  along  the same
dimensions  as the indicators  of financial  development,  discussed  in the previous  section.
Structure-Size  indicates  the size of stock  markets  relative  to the size of the banking  sector  and  is
defined  as the log of the ratio  of Market  Capitalization  and Bank  Credit.  Structure-Efficiency  is
defined  as the log  of the product  of Overhead  Costs  and  Value  Traded  and indicates  the
efficiency  of the stock  market  relative  to the banking  sector. Structure-Aggregate  combines  the
previous  three  measures  and is thus a conglomerate  indicator  of the size,  activity  and  efficiency
of stock  markets  relative  to banks. Specifically,  it is the first  principal  component  of Structure-
Activity,  Structure-Size  and Structure-Effliciency.  Structure-Dummy  is a simple  bivariate
11classification  of market-  versus  bank-based  financial  systems. Specifically,  it equals  one if
Structure-Aggregate  is greater  than  the sample  median  and  zero  otherwise.  Note,  however,  that
an economy  can be classified  as market-based  or bank-based  only  relative  to the other  countries
in the sample,  since  there  is no absolute  measure  of market-  or bank-based  financial  systems.
Our financial  structure  indicators  vary  significantly  across  countries.  Table  2 presents  the
ranking  of countries  for the financial  structure  measures.  While  Taiwan  (Value  Traded:  150%,
Bank  Credit:  83%)  is considered  the most market-based  financial  system,  according  to Structure-
Activity,  Panama  is considered  the most  bank-based  system  (Value  Traded:  0.3%,  Bank  Credit:
49%). While  the classification  of some  countries  is intuitively  attractive,  such  as the United
States,  Great  Britain  and Switzerland  as market-based,  Structure-Activity  also classifies  Turkey,
Mexico  and Brazil  as market-based.  This is however,  due to a very low value  of Bank  Credit,
rather than  a high level  of Value  Traded.  The other  indicators  of financial  structure  produce
similar  anomalies.  Ghana  is identified  as the most  market-based  economy,  since  it has an
extremely  low  level  of Bank  Credit  (3%  of GDP),  not because  of a high  level of market
capitalization  (12%).  Brazil  is identified  as having  relatively  efficient  markets,  which  is due to
very  high overhead  costs in the Brazilian  banking  sector. A financial  system  can therefore  be
identified  as market-based  either  because  markets  are very  well developed  or banks are
underdeveloped.
The indicators  of financial  structure  are highly  and significantly  correlated  with each
other,  as indicated  in Table  1. While  Structure-Activity  and Structure-Efficiency  are also
positively  correlated  with many  of the financial  development  indicators  - indicating  that
financially  more  developed  economies  have  more  market-based  financial  systems  -, Structure-
Size  is not correlated  with any of the financial  development  measures.
12Although  these  financial  structure  measures  do not directly  measure  all of the channels
via which  banks  and markets  influence  economic  activity,  they  are the most  comprehensive  set
of indicators  that  have  been  constructed  to date  for a broad  cross-section  of countries.  Taken
together,  these  indicators  provide  a measure  of the comparative  role of banks and  markets  in the
economy.  Furthermore,  the underlying  measures  of bank  development  and  stock  market
liquidity  exert  a strong  influence  on economic  growth. Thus,  the basic  measures  of bank
development  and stock  market  liquidity  have  some  analytical  content.  Furthermore,  Demirguc,-
Kunt  and  Levine  (1999)  show  that countries  with  strong  shareholder  rights  and high  accounting
standards  tend  to have  more  market-based  financial  systems.  Thus,  key legal and  regulatory
differences  match-up  with  the measures  of financial  structure  that  we use to assess  the
relationship  between  industrial  performance  and degree  to which  countries  are bank-based  or
market-based.
2.3. The Legal Environment
We use three indicators  of the rights  of outside  investors  and  the degree  to which  these
rights  are enforced.  These  data  are from  LLSV  (1998).
Creditor  is an index  of the degree  to which  the legal codes  of the country  protect  the
claims  of secured  creditors  in the case  of reorganization  or liquidation  of a company. It ranges
from  zero  to four and  is the sum  of four dummy  variables  that indicate  whether  (i) the
reorganization  procedure  does  not impose  an automatic  stay on assets,  thereby  not preventing
secured  creditors  from  taking  possession  of loan  collateral,  (ii)  secured  creditors  are ranked  first
in the case  of liquidation,  (iii)  management  does  not stay in charge  of the firm  during
reorganization,  thereby  enhancing  creditors'  power,  and (iv)  management  needs  creditors'
13consent  when  filing  for reorganization.  In economies  with higher  values  of Creditor,  outside
investors  have  more  rights  relative  to the management  and other  stakeholders,  and should
therefore  be more  willing  to provide  the external  resources  that  firms  need.  Among  the countries
in our sample  Ecuador,  Egypt,  Great  Britain,  India,  Israel,  Kenya,  Malaysia,  Pakistan  and
Zimbabwe  have  very high levels  of Creditor  (four),  whereas  Colombia,  France,  Mexico,  Peru
and Philippines  have  very low levels  of Creditor  (zero).
Anti-Director  is an index  of the degree  to which  the legal codes  of the country  protect
minority  shareholder  rights. It ranges  from  zero  to six and is the sum of six dummy  variables
that indicate  whether  (i) shareholders  are allowed  to mail  their proxy  vote to the firm, (ii)
shareholders  are not required  to deposit  their  shares  prior to the General  Shareholders'  Meeting,
(iii)  cumulative  voting  or proportional  representation  of minorities  on the board  of directors  is
allowed,  (iv)  an oppressed  minority  mechanism  is in place, (v)  the minimum  percentage  of share
capital  that  entitles  a shareholder  to call for an Extraordinary  Shareholders'  Meeting  is less  than
or equal  to 10  percent,  and (vi)  shareholders  have  preemptive  rights  that can only be waived  by a
shareholders'  vote.  In economies  with  higher  values  of Anti-Director,  minority  shareholders  are
better  protected  against  expropriation  by management  and  large  shareholders  and should
therefore  be more  willing  to provide  external  financing  to firms. Canada,  Chile,  Great  Britain,
India,  Pakistan,  the U.S.  and South  Africa  have  all very extensive  minority  shareholder
protection  (five),  whereas  Belgium  experiences  an extremely  low  level (zero).
Rule  ofLaw is an assessment  of the law  and order  tradition  of a country  that  ranges  from
10,  strong  law and order  tradition,  to 1,  weak  law  and order  tradition. This  measure  was
constructed  by ICRG  and is an average  over  the period 1982-1995.  In countries  with a higher
law  and order  tradition,  outside  investors  can more  easily  enforce  their  claims  and  rights  and
14should  therefore  be more  willing  to provide  external  finance.  Austria,  Australia,  Belgium,
Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland  and  the
U.S. are  the countries  in our sample  with the  highest  level  of Rule of Law (six),  whereas  there
are five countries  with values  below  two: Colombia,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Philippines,  and Sri Lanka.
While  Creditor  and  Anti-Director  are  not significantly  correlated  with any  of the financial
development  and  structure  indicators,  the correlations  in Table  1 indicate  that countries  with
higher  levels  of Rule  of Law experience  higher  levels  of financial  development  and  have  more
market-based  financial  systems.
2.4. The Legal Origin
Legal  systems  with European  origin  can be classified  into four major  legal families
[Reynolds  and  Flores 1996]:  the English  common  law  and the French,  German,  and
Scandinavian  civil  law countries. 5 As  described  by Glendon,  Gordon,  and Osakwe  (1982),
Roman  law was compiled  under  the direction  of Byzantine  Emperor  Justinian  in the sixth
century. Over  subsequent  centuries,  the Glossators  and Commentators  interpreted,  adapted,  and
amended  the Law. In the 1  7th and  18th centuries  the Scandinavian  countries  formalized  their  own
legal  codes  that  have remained  relatively  unaffected  from the far  reaching  influences  of the
German  and especially  the French  Civil  Codes.
Napoleon  directed  the writing  of the French  Civil  Code  in 1804  and made  it a priority  to
secure  the adoption  of the Code  in France  and  all conquered  territories,  including  Italy,  Poland,
the Low  Countries,  and  the Habsburg  Empire. Also,  France  extended  her legal  influence  to parts
of the Near East,  Northern  and  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  Indochina,  Oceania,  French  Guyana,  and  the
5  This  does  not include  legal  systems  with  Islamic  roots  or Socialist  systems.
15French Caribbean  islands during the colonial era. Furthermore,  the French Civil Code was a
major influence on the Portuguese and Spanish legal systems, which helped spread the French
legal tradition to Central and South America. The German Civil Code (Burgerliches
Gesetzbuch)  was completed  almost a century later in 1896. The German Code exerted a big
influence on Austria and Switzerland, as well as China (and hence Taiwan), Czechoslovakia,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia. Also, the German Civil Code heavily influenced the
Japanese Civil Code, which helped spread the German legal tradition to Korea.
Unlike these Civil Law countries, the English legal system is common law, where judges
trying to resolve particular cases primarily formed the laws. The Common Law tradition was
spread mainly through colonialism to North America, parts of Africa, the Caribbean and Asia.
Since most countries have acquired their legal systems through occupation and
colonialism, the legal origin can be regarded as exogenous. Furthermore, LLSV (1997, 1998)
have shown that the legal origin of a country materially influences its legal treatment of creditors
and shareholders,  its accounting  standards and the efficiency of contract enforcement. Levine
(1998, 1999 and 2000a) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) show that the legal origin explains
cross-country variations in the level of financial intermediary and stock market development.
Given its exogenous character and its explanatory  power for cross-country variation in
financial development, we will be using the legal origin of countries as instruments for financial
development and structure to thus address concerns of simultaneity bias and reverse causality.
Specifically, we want to control for the possibility that faster growing countries or countries with
a specific industrial structure develop a financial system or structure that fits their needs best. By
extracting the exogenous components of financial development  and structure we isolate the
16impact of the financial system on economic  growth, industry expansion, new firm creation and
firms' access to long-term finance.
3. Cross-Country Growth Regressions
This section explores the impact of financial structure on long-run economic growth in a
sample of 48 countries,  with data averaged over the period 1980-95. We (i) describe the
methodology, (ii) present evidence of the impact of financial structure and financial development
on economic  growth, (iii) discuss evidence on the law and finance approach, (iv) describe
different robustness tests, and (v) summarize our findings.
3.1. Econometric  Methodology
To test the validity of the (i) market-based, (ii) bank-based, (iii) financial services, and
(iv) law and finance approach in a cross-country  sample, we modify the standard growth
regression as follows:
Growthi  = a' Xi + /3FDj  + yFSj  + ej  (3.1)
where Growth  is the average annual growth rate of real per capita GDP, calculated as regression
coefficient from an OLS regression, Xis a set of potential growth determinants, FD is an
indicator of financial development, FS is a measure of financial structure and £ is the error tern.
The four competing  hypotheses predict different signs for J and y. The market-based view
predicts that market-based  financial systems grow faster, implying  3>0  and y>O.  The bank-
based view holds that bank-based systems are better for growth, implying f >0 and y<0.  The
financial-services view holds that financial structure does not matter for growth and that it is
17overall financial development that enhances economic growth. This implies [3>0  and y=O.  The
law and finance view, finally, claims that only the part of financial development defined by the
legal system is linked with economic  growth. If we use the legal rights of outside investors, and
the efficiency of contract enforcement as instrumental  variables to extract the exogenous
component of financial development, the law and finance view also predicts P>0 and =0.
We use both Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimations and Instrumental  Variable (IV)
estimations, using the legal origin of countries as instruments for countries, as in Levine, Loayza,
and Beck (2000). IV regressions allow us to control for simultaneity bias and reverse causality
from growth rates to financial development,  by extracting the exogenous component of financial
development  and structure. To assess the law and finance view, we will be using Creditor, Anti-
Director and Rule of Law as instrumental variables for financial development to thus extract the
component of finance that is defined by the legal system.  We will examine the appropriateness
of the instruments with a test of over-identifying  restrictions, developed in the context of GMM
by Hansen (1982) and further explained in Newey and West (1987). The null-hypothesis is that
the instrumental  variables are not correlated with the error term. The instruments are appropriate
if we cannot reject the null hypothesis. We can interpret this result as indicating that the
instruments (legal origin or the legal system indicators) affect real per capita GDP growth only
through the financial development or structure indicators and the variables in the conditioning
information  set (that is, the other determinants  of growth).
To assess the robustness of our findings, we control for other potential growth
determinants  in eq. (1). Specifically, we will use two different sets of conditioning information.
The  policy conditioning information  set contains the log of real per capita GDP in 1980 to
control for convergence and the average years of schooling to control for the effect of human
18capital accumulation.  Furthermore,  we include (i) the logarithm of one plus the average rate of
inflation, (ii) the logarithm of one plus the average black market premium, (iii) the logarithm of
government size as a share of GDP, and (iv) the logarithm of exports plus imports as a share of
GDP. We include the inflation rate and the government size to proxy for macroeconomic
stability and government intrusion, and the trade share and the black market premium to capture
the degree of openness of economies. The full conditioning  information  set contains the policy
information set plus a measure of ethnical fractionalization,  revolutions and coups and political
assassinations.6
3.2. Financial Structure and Long-Run Growth
The results in Table 3 indicate that financial structure is not significantly related to
economic growth. For conciseness, the table only reports the results for the two variables of
interest - Finance-Activity and the financial structure indicators. Here we present only results
using the policy conditioning  information set. All regressions are run with Ordinary Least
Squares and using heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors. None of the five structure
indicators enters significantly in the regression. Finance-Activity,  on the other hand, enters
significantly positive in all but the first regression. These results, therefore, do not give support
to either the market- or the bank-based  view.  The results in Table 4 confirm these findings,
using the other indicators of financial development as control variables.  The distinction  between
market- and bank-based financial system does not explain much of the variation in cross-country
growth rates.
6 Levine,  Loayza,  and  Beck (2000)  and  Beck,  Levine,  and  Loayza  (2000)  have  used similar  conditioning
information  sets  in their  work  on the impact  of financial  intermediary  development  on economic  growth.  We also
tried a full  conditioning  information  set that  comprises  the policy  conditioning  information  set and indicators  of civil
19The results in Table 5 confirm that financial development is positively correlated with
long-run economic  growth and that simultaneity bias or reverse causality does not drive these
results. We present results both using OLS and IV regressions. All indicators of financial
development enter significantly at the 5% level, except for Finance-Size. This result is
consistent with the findings of Levine and Zervos (1998). They find that market capitalization  is
not a robust predictor of economic growth. The liquidity of the stock market, not its pure size
(market capitalization),  matters for economic growth. The tests of over-identifying restrictions
for the IV regressions indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are
not correlated with the error terms.
The results in Table 5 are not only statistically  significant, but also economically
important. Consider Argentina that had a value of Finance-Activity  of -5.99 over the period
1980-95. If Argentina had enjoyed a level of financial development as Thailand (Finance-
Activity=-1.98),  a country with lower real per capita GDP in 1980, the regression results
suggests, that Argentina would have grown two percentage points faster over this period. 7
The results in Tables 3, 4 and 5 give support for the financial services view by
underlining the importance that overall financial development has for economic growth. The
results are not consistent with either the market- or the bank-based view.
3.3. The Law and finance View and Long-Run Growth
The results  in Table  6 are consistent  with  the law and  finance  view. Here  we use as
instruments  specific  elements  of the legal  system  that  are important  for financial  development.
Specifically, we use Creditor, Anti-Director and Rule of Law as instruments for the indicator of
liberties,  revolutions  and  coups,  political  assassinations,  bureaucratic  efficiency  and  corruption.  The  results  are
similar. See also Levine (2000b).
20financial  development.  The results  are overwhelmingly  in support  of the law and  finance  view.
All indicators  of financial  development  enter  significantly  in the regression  at the 5%-level.
Furthermore,  the regressions  pass  the test of  the overidentifying  restrictions.  That is, the data  do
not reject  the hypothesis  that Creditor,  Anti-director,  and Rule  of Law influence  growth  only
through  their  effects  on financial  development  or the other  explanatory  variables. The
coefficients  show  similar  sizes as when  using  the legal  origin  as instruments  and are larger  than
in the OLS  regressions.  Thus,  the data  are consistent  with the view  that the component  of overall
financial  development  explained  by legal codes  and  their enforcement  is positively  and
significantly  related  to economic  growth.
3.4. Sensitivity Analysis
Our results  are robust  to several  robustness  checks. 8 First,  we re-run  the regressions  in
Tables  3, 4 and 5 using  the full conditioning  information  set. While  the financial  development
indicators  are significant  most of the time,  the financial  structure  indicators  enter  insignificantly.
Second,  we include  a dummy  for very  undeveloped  financial  systems  in the regressions  with
financial  structure.  This does  not alter  our results. None of the structure  indicators  enters
significantly.  Third,  we use Creditor,  Anti-director  and  Rule  of Law as instruments  for financial
structure.  Again,  the indicators  of financial  structure  do not enter  significantly.  Finally,  we
examine  unbalanced  financial  systems.  While  financial  structure  might  not matter,  financial
systems  with a distorted  structure  might  impede  the efficient  provision  of financial  services. We
therefore  create  a dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value one  if Value  Traded  is above  the sample
mean  and Bank  Credit  below  the mean  or vice  versa. Using  this indicator  of unbalanced
7 We use  the coefficient  estimate  for Finance-Activity  from  Table  5, top  panel.
8 Results  available  on request.  See  also  Levine  (2000b)  for further  robustness  tests.
21financial systems does not change our results - classifying countries, as having unbalanced
financial systems does not explain long-term economic growth.
3.5.  Summary
Our findings are consistent with the financial services and the law and finance views.
Financial development and the component defined by the legal protection of outside investors
explain long-term cross-country growth rates. Financial structure, i.e. the distinction between
market- and bank-based financial systems does not offer any additional information. These
results are robust to the use of different indicators of financial development and structure and
different conditioning information  sets. These results are also robust to the use of a large array of
sensitivity tests, described by Levine (2000b).
4. Industry-Level Results
This section explores our four competing  hypotheses in a panel data set of 34 countries
and 36 industries. Specifically, we explore (i) whether industries that depend heavily on external
finance grow faster in market- or bank-based financial systems, and (ii) new firms are more
likely to form in bank-based or a market-based  financial systems. Thus, unlike in the previous
cross-country section, we focus on a specific channel through which financial development and
potentially financial structure affects economic activity and industrial structure. We will first
discuss the econometric methodology and the additional data we will be using. We will then
explore whether externally dependent industries grow faster in market- or bank-based financial
systems or whether it is the overall level of financial development that determines industrial
22growth  patterns  across  countries.  In a second  step, we will decompose  industry  growth  in its two
components  -growth  in the number  of firms  and growth  in the average  size of firms  - and  will
analyze  whether  financial  structure  and development  determines  the creation  of new  firms.
Finally,  we will test the importance  of the legal system  for industry  growth  and new firm
creation.
4.1. Econometric  Methodology  and the Data
We will use a panel of 34 countries  and 36 industries  to test our four hypotheses.  We will
build on work  by Rajan  and Zingales  (1998)  and explore  the interaction  of industry  and  country
characteristics,  i.e. the dependence  of industries  on external  finance  and the level and  structure  of
financial  development  across  countries.  This subsection  describes  the methodology  and data.
4.1.1. The Methodology
Financial  intermediaries  and markets  help overcome  market  frictions  that drive  a wedge
between  the price of external  and internal  finance.  Lower  costs of external  finance  facilitate  firm
growth  and new firm  formation.  Therefore,  industries  that are naturally  heavy users of external
finance  should  benefit  disproportionately  more  from greater  financial  development  than
industries  that are not naturally  heavy  users  of external  finance.  That should  be especially  true
for new firms  in these industries.
Rajan and Zingales  (1998)  find evidence  consistent  with the hypothesis  that industries  that
rely more  heavily  on external  finance  grow  faster  in countries  with a better-developed  financial
system.  Furthermore,  Rajan and Zingales  show  that  the effect  of financial  development  on the
industrial  growth  runs  mostly  through  growth  in the number  of establishments  rather than
23through  growth  in the average  size of establishments.  So financial  development  improves
disproportionately  the prospects  of young  firms  in industries  that  rely heavily on external
finance.
This section  extends  the work  by Rajan  and Zingales  and explores  whether  industries  with
a high need  of external  finance  grow  faster  in economies  with bank-  or market-based  financial
systems. We will use the following  regression  to assess  the impact  of financial  development  and
financial  structure  on industry  growth  and  the creation  of new firms.
Growthlk  =  cxaCountry,  +  /,3Industry,  + yShare,k  + S1  (Externalk  * FD.)  +
J2 (External,,  * FS1) + E£;k,
where  Growthsk  is the average  annual  growth  rate of value added  or the growth  in number  of
firms  in industry  kand country  i.  Countryand  Industryare  country  and industry  dummies,
respectively,  and Share,k is the share  of industry  k in manufacturing  in country  i in 1980.
Externalk  is the measure of dependence on external finance for industry k as measured  for a
sample  of U.S. companies  over the period 1980-89.  FDi  and FS,  are indicators  of financial
development  and financial  structure  for country  i, respectively.  We interact  the external
dependence  of an industry  (Externa)  with both (a)  a measure  of overall  financial  development
(FP and (b) an index  of the degree  of market-based  versus  bank-based,  i.e., an index  of
financial  structure  (FS). 9 The dummy  variables  for industries  and countries  correct  for country
and industry  specific  characteristics  that might  determine  industry  growth  patterns. We thus
isolate  the effect  that the interaction  of external  dependence  and financial  development/structure
has on industry  growth  rates  relative  to country  and industry  means. By including  the initial
9We  do  not  include  Financial  Development  or Financial  Structure  on  their  own,  since  we  focus  on  within-country,
across-industry  growth  rates.
24share of an industry we control for a convergence effect; we expect industries with a large share
to grow more slowly, and therefore a negative sign on  lo
The different hypotheses imply different predictions about the sign and significance of 81
and 82. The market-based  view  predicts that industries that are dependent on external finance
grow faster in economies with market-oriented financial systems and higher levels of financial
development, thus implying 81>0  and 82>0.  The bank-based  viewpredicts that industries that are
dependent on external finance grow faster in economies with bank-oriented financial systems
and higher levels of financial development, thus implying 51>0  and 82<0.  The financial-services
view  predicts that industries dependent on external finance grow faster in economies with a
higher level of overall financial development, whereas the financial structure should not matter,
thus implying 51>0  and 82=0.  The law and  finance  viewpredicts that industries dependent on
external finance grow faster in economies that protect the rights of outside investors more
efficiently, whereas financial structure should not matter. If we replace FD 1 with indicators of
these legal rights and contract enforcement, this implies 81>0  and 62=0.
We run both Ordinary-Least-Squares (OLS) regressions and Instrumental Variables (IV)
regressions. IV regressions allow us to address the issue of endogeneity of independent variables.
Specifically, we want to control for the possible endogeneity of the level and the structure of
financial development. Whereas the above equation suggests that an exogenously given level or
structure of financial sector activity might interact with the external dependence of industries  to
determine industry growth rates, financial markets and institutions might have arisen due to a
given industrial structure. As in the previous section, we will be using the legal origin of
10  This does not correspond exactly to the convergence concept known from cross-country growth regressions. We
include the share in manufacturing rather than the level, since we focus on within-country, across-industry growth
rates. As in Rajan and Zingales y enters significantly negative in most regressions.
25countries to extract the exogenous component of financial development and structure. We will
also use the religious composition of countries as additional instruments.'" LLSV (1999) show
that the dominant religion of a country influences institutional development.
4.1.2. External Dependence
We use industry-level data on external dependence from Rajan and Zingales (1998). The
underlying assumption in Rajan and Zingales - and our work -- is that for technological reasons
some industries depend more heavily on external finance than others.  Unfortunately, we can
only observe the actual use of external finance, but not the demand for it. For countries with very
well developed financial systems, Rajan and Zingales note that external funds will be supplied
very elastically, so that the actual use of external finance would primarily reflect the demand for
external finance.  Assuming that the variance of the need of external finance across industries
persists across countries we can thus use the actual external dependence of industries as observed
in a country with a very well developed financial system as a proxy for the "natural" dependence
of industries on external finance. As discussed in Rajan and Zingales, we use the United States
to compute the natural external dependence of industries.
The data are from Standard and Poor's Compustat for U.S. firms in 36 industries. This
database contains only publicly listed firms. A firm's dependence on external finance is defined
as the share of investment that cannot be financed through internal cash flows; or as capital
expenditures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures. Both numerator
and denominator are averaged over the 1980s to smooth temporal fluctuations. The industry
values are calculated as medians rather than means to thus prevent outliers from dominating the
"' Unlike in the cross-sectional growth regressions we include financial structure and financial development
indicators at the same time, since we can exploit more variance in these panel regressions. We therefore extend our
26results. Table A2 lists the external dependence for all 36 industries. The drug industry is the
industry most dependent on external finance, whereas the tobacco industry has no demand for
external finance, i.e. our dependence measure is less than zero.
4.1.3. Industry Growth Rates
Our dependent  variable  is the average  annual  growth  rate of value added.  We use the data
obtained  by Rajan  and Zingales  from the Industrial  Statistics  Yearbook  database  put together  by
the United  Nations  Statistical  Division  (1993). We also  use a decomposition  of the industry
growth  rate. Specifically,  we consider  the growth  in the number  of establishments,  as opposed  to
the growth  in the average  size of establishments.  12 The creation  of new firms  is more  likely  to
depend  on external  resources  than existing  firms.  The decomposition  of industry  growth
therefore  provides  both a robustness  test of the previous  results  and a more detailed  exploration
of the mechanisms  through  which  financial  development  and financial  structure  influence
industrial  growth  patterns  across  countries.
4.2. Financial  Structure  and Industry Growth
The results in Table 7 indicate that fimancial  structure does not have an independent
impact  on industrial  growth  patterns  across  countries. 13 Although  the interaction  terms  of
external  dependence  with Structure-Activity  and Structure-Aggregate  show  coefficients  that are
significant at the 5%-level in the OLS regressions, these results are not confirmed by the
instrumental variable regressions. None of the interaction terms with financial structure enters
set of instrumental  variables  by religious  composition.
12 There  are no cross-country  data available  on firms. An establishment  is defined  as a "unit,  which  engages,  under
a single  ownership  or control,  in one,  or predominantly  one,  kind  of activity  at a single  location."
27significantly at the 5%-level. These results are not consistent with the market- or the bank-based
view.
The results in Table 8 strengthen the previous findings and give support to the financial
services view. The interaction terms with financial development always enter significantly at the
5%-level level, whereas none of the interaction terms with financial structure enters significantly.
These results indicate that externally dependent industries grow relatively faster in countries with
better-developed  financial systems, while the specific structure of the financial system does not
have any impact on industrial growth patterns.
4.3. Financial  Structure  and the Creation  of New  Firms
The results in Table 9 indicate that new firms are more easily created in countries with
higher levels of financial development, whereas financial structure does not explain industry
patterns in the growth in the number of firms across countries.1 4 While none of the interaction
terms with financial structure enters significantly in the regressions, the interaction terms with
the financial development indicators enter significantly at the 10%-level in the regressions with
Structure-Size and Structure-Aggregate. They do not enter significantly in the regressions with
Structure-Activity.  We can explain this inconsistency with the fact that Structure-Activityis the
structure measure that shows the highest correlation with the indicators of financial development.
Overall, these results are again consistent with the financial-services view and are not consistent
with the market- or bank-based view.
13 Since  Structure-  and  Finance-Efficiency  are available  only  for the years 1990-95,  we do not use  these  measures  in
this  section.
14 Beck  and Levine  (2000a)  show  that  the growth  in the average  size  of firms  is related  to neither  financial
development  nor  financial  structure.
284.4. Industry  Growth,  New  Firm Creation  and the Law  and finance  View
The results  in Table 10 show  that externally  dependent  industries  grow  faster  and  new
firms  are created  more  easily in countries  with high level of creditor  and shareholder  rights  and
enforcement  of these  rights. While  none of the interaction  terms  with financial  structure  enters
significantly,  the interaction  terms  with the three legal  variables  enter  jointly significantly  at the
10%-level  in all six regressions.  The p-values  on the individual  coefficients  indicate  that  it is
especially  the enforcement  of laws  that is important  for the growth  of externally  dependent
industries  and the creation  of new firms  in these  industries.
4.5. Sensitivity  Analysis
Our  findings  are robust  to a number  of sensitivity  checks  [Beck  and Levine  2000a]. First,
we use a larger  sample  of 42 countries  some  of which  are not in the 48-country  sample  of this
paper.  Our results  do not change. While  industries  with higher  need of external  finance  grow
faster  in economies  with better-developed  financial  sectors  and better  protection  of outside
investors,  financial  structure  cannot  explain  industry  growth  patterns  across  countries.  Second,
we use alternative  measures  of external  dependence,  provided  by Rajan and Zingales.
Specifically,  we use external  dependence  measured  for a sample  of Canadian  firms  to thus  test
whether  our results  are due to peculiarities  of the U.S.  financial  system. The results  do not
change. We also use a measure  of external  finance  computed  from a sample  of firms  that  have
gone public  over the previous  10  years,  since  young  firms  are especially  dependent  on external
finance. Again,  our main  findings  hold. Finally,  we use an indicator  for unbalanced  financial
systems  to explore  whether  the growth  of industries  that depend  heavily  on external  finance  is
29impacted  by distorted  financial  systems.  As in the cross-country  analysis  we do not find any
significant  impact  of the unbalanced  indicator.
4.6. Summary
Our findings  from the country-industry  panel  confirm  the results  from the cross-country
regressions  and provide  support  for the financial  services  and law and finance  view. Industries
that  depend  relatively  more  on external  finance  grow faster  in economies  with higher  levels of
financial  development  and legal systems  that  better  protect  the rights  of outside  investors.
Industries  that are heavy users  of extemal  finance  do not grow  faster and new firms  are not
created  more  rapidly  in either  a market-  or bank-based  financial  system.  It is thus the overall
level of financial  development,  but not a specific  structure  of the financial  system  that  enables
especially  new firms  to overcome  barriers  in obtaining  extemal  funding.
5. Firm-Level Results
In this  section  we use firm-level  data from  a panel of 33 countries  and 6 years  between
1990  and 1995  to explore  whether  firms' access  to extemal  finance  varies  across  financial
systems  with different  structures,  or whether  the overall  level of financial  development  and the
legal  system  determine  firms' access  to external  finance. In this section  we (i) describe  the
methodology  and data that  we use, (ii)  assess  the market-based,  bank-based  and financial
services  view,  and (iii)  explore  the importance  of legal  institutions  for firms' access  to extemal
finance.
305.1. Econometric Methodology and Data
We follow  an approach  developed  by Demirgu-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1998,  2000)  to
measure  whether  firms' growth  in an economy  is financially  constrained. Exploring  the relation
between  firms' growth  and financial  development  and  structure  directly  does not control  for
differences  in the amount  of external  financing  needed  by firms  in the same industry  but in
different  countries.  These differences  may  arise  because  firms  in different  countries  may  employ
different  technologies,  because  profit  rates  may  differ across  countries,  or because  investment
opportunities  and demand  may  differ.  In our empirical  tests we take into account  the possibility
that  these factors  may  affect  the demand  for external  capital.  To control  for these  differences  at
the firm  level,  we calculate  for each firm  in an economy  the rate at which  it can grow,  using (i)
only its internal  funds or (ii) using  its internal  funds  and short-term  borrowing.  We then
compute  the percentage  of firms  that grow  at rates  that exceed  each  of these  two estimated  rates.
These statistics  yield  estimates  of the proportion  of firms  in an economy  relying  on external
financing  to grow.
The firm-level  data consist  of accounting  data  for the largest  publicly  traded
manufacturing  firms  in 33 countries,  using  data from the Worldscope  database.  We estimate  a
firm's potential  growth  rate using  the standard  "percentage  of sales"  financial  planning  model
[Higgins  1974].  This approach  relates  a firm's growth  rate of sales to its need  for investment
funds,  based  on three  simplifying  assumptions.  First, the ratio  of assets used in production  to
sales  is constant.  Second,  the firm's profits  per unit of sales are constant.  Finally,  the economic
deprecation  rate equals  the accounting  depreciation  rate. Under  these assumptions,  the firm's
financing  need  in period  t of a firm  growing  at gt percent  per year is given  by
EFN, = g, * Assets, - (1- g,) * Earnings, * b,  (5.1)
31where  EFNt  is the external  financing  need  and bt is the fraction  of the firm's earnings  that  are
retained  for reinvestment  at time t. Earnings  are calculated  after  interest  and taxes.  While  the first
term on the right-hand  side of eq. (5.1)  denotes  the required  investment  for a firm  growing  at gt
percent,  the second  term  is the internally  available  funds  for investment,  assuming  a constant
retention  rate bt.
We use two different  estimates  of a firm's attainable  growth  rate.  The internally  financed
growth  rate IGt is the maximum  growth  rate that can be financed  with internal  resources  only.
Assuming  that  the firm  retains  all its earnings,  i.e. bt=1,  equating  EFNt  to zero  and solving  eq.
(5.1)  for gt,  we obtain
IG, = ROAt  /(1 - ROA,)  (5.2)
where  ROAt  is the firm's return  on assets (Earnings/Assets).  The definition  of IG thus assumes
that firm  does  not rely on any  external  source  to finance  its growth.
The short-term  fmanced  growth  rate SGt  is the maximum  growth  rate that can be
obtained  if the firm  reinvests  all its earnings  and  obtains  enough  short-term  external  resources  to
maintain  the ratio  of its short-term  liabilities  to assets. To compute  SGt,  we first  replace  total
assets  in eq. (5.1)  by assets  that are not financed  by new  short-term  credit  - long-term  capital  -,
calculated  as total assets times  one minus  the ratio  of short-term  liabilities  to total assets.  SGt  is
then  given  by
SGt = ROLTC, /(1 - ROLTC,)  (5.3)
where  ROLTCt  is the ratio  of earnings,  after  tax and interest,  to long-term  capital.  The definition
of SG thus  assumes  that the firm  does  not access  any long-term  borrowings  or sales of equity  to
finance  its growth.
32The estimates  of IG and SG  are conservative  for several  reasons.  First, we assume  that  a
firm  utilizes  the unconstrained  sources  of finance-  trade  credit  in the case IG and trade credit  and
short-term  borrowing  in the case  of SG - no more intensively  than it is currently  doing.  Second,
firms  with spare  capacities  do not need  to invest  and may  grow  at a faster  rate than  predicted
without  accessing  external  resources.  Third,  the financial  planning  model  abstracts  from
technical  advances  that reduce  the requirements  for investment  capital.  Thus, it may  overstate  the
costs of growth  and underestimate  the maximum  growth  rate attainable  using  unconstrained
sources  of financing.
For each country  we then calculate  STCOUNTt  and LTCOUNTt,  the percentage  of firms
whose realized  annual  real growth  rate of sales exceeds  the predicted  rates IGt  and SGt,
respectively.  STCOUNTt  is calculated  as  f d  f  / n,,, where  nit  is the number  of firms  in
country  i in period t and drt  takes  the value one  if the firm's real growth  rate of sales exceeds
lGf,t,  and zero  otherwise.  LTCOUNT 1 t is calculated  in a similar  way, using SGfit.  STCOUNT  is
thus an estimate  of the proportion  of firms  in a country  that obtain  external  funding,  and
LTCOUNT  is an estimate  of firms  in a country  that obtain  long-term  external  financing.
Table 11  presents  the average  values  for STCOUNT  and LTCOUNT  for all 33 countries
in our sample.  There  is a large  variation  in the proportion  of firms  that obtain  external  resources.
Only  26%  of firms  in New Zealand  grow  at rates requiring  external  financing,  while 100%  of
firms  in Austria  do. Only 17%  of firms  in Chile  grow  beyond  the rate predicted  by the use of
internal  and  short-term  external  funds,  but 100%  in Austria.  These  differences  are likely  to be
affected  by the availability  of external  finance  both directly,  and indirectly,  as the composition  of
firms  in each economy  evolves  through  mergers  and diversification  to take  advantage  of the
available  sources  of financing.
33To analyze  our different  hypotheses  in our sample  of 33 countries  and 6 years,  we run the
following  regressions
yjt  =  8 FDit + A 2 FS 1, +  83CVj,  + elt  (5.4)
where  y is either  STCOUNT  or LTCOUNT,  FD is one of the five indicators  of financial
development,  defined  above, FS  is one of the five indicators  of financial  structure,  CVis a set of
control  variables,  and  e is the error term.
We estimate  eq. (5.4)  using  Instrumental  Variables  (IV)  techniques  to control  for
simultaneity  bias and reverse  causality.  Specifically,  as in the previous  two  sections,  we will be
using  the legal  origin of countries  to extract  the exogenous  component  of the level of financial
development  and structure.
To assess  the robustness  of the link between  the proportion  of firms  that receive  external
resources  and the level of financial  development  and structure,  we include  several  control
variables. Specifically,  we include  the average  size of firms,  since  firms  that are larger  relative
to the economy  might enjoy  better  access  to external  financing  than  smaller  firms. We include
the inflation  rate  to control  for measurement  errors  in firms' financial  statements  in highly
inflationary  economies.  We include  the level and  the growth  rate of real per capita  GDP. We
include  the level of real  per capita  GDP  to control  for determinants  of firms' access  to external
financing  that  are related  to the level of economic  development,  but are independent  of the
financial  system. We include  the growth  rate hypothesizing  that firms' desire  to grow depends
on the rate of growth  of the economy.  Finally,  we include  Rule  of Law  to control  for effects  of
the legal  system  that  are independent  of the effect  of the financial  system.
345.2.  Excess  Growth  of Firms  and Financial  Structure
The results  in Table 12 indicate  that  the share  of firms  growing  at rates  requiring  external
financing  does  not vary across  countries  with different  financial  structures.  For conciseness,  the
table only reports  the results  for the variable  of interest  - financial  structure. The top panel
reports  the results  for STCOUNT,  the bottom  panel  for LTCOUNT.  Except  for Structure-Size,
none of the indicators  of financial  structure  enters  significantly  at the 5% level in the regressions
of either  STCOUNT  or LTCOUNT.  These  findings  are not consistent  with either  the market-  or
the bank-based  view.
The Table  13 results  provide  evidence  for the financial  services  view. We again  report
only the variable  of interest  - financial  development.  All four  indicators  of financial
development  enter significantly  positive  at the 5%-level  in the regressions  of STCOUNT.  This
indicates  that  firms  are more  likely  to grow  at rates  that  require  external  financing  in economies
with higher  level of financial  sector  development.  All four  indicators  of financial  development
enter significantly  positive  at the 10%-level  in the regressions  of LTCOUNT.  We interpret  this
as evidence  that the share  of firms  that  grow  at rates  requiring  long-term  external  financing  is
higher  in countries  with better-developed  financial  sector.
5.3. Excess Growth of Firms and the Law and finance View
To explore  the law  and finance  view,  we first  regress  our indicators  of financial
development  on our three  legal indicators,  Creditor,  Anti-Director,  and Rule of Law.  The fitted
values  of these  regressions  indicate  the level of financial  development  predicted  by the legal
environment  of a country.  We also use the residual  from each  regression  - Excess-Finance  - to
indicate  the component  of financial  development  that is not predicted  by the legal environment.
35In the second  stage,  we then  run eq. (5.4)  including  both the predicted  value of financial
development  from  the first stage  and Excess-Finance.  The law and finance  view predicts  a
positive  coefficient  on the fitted  value  of Finance  and an insignificant  coefficient  on Excess-
Finance.  A significantly  positive  coefficient  on Excess-Finance  would  indicate  an importance  of
other  components  of the financial  sector  not  predicted  by the legal systems  for firms' growth. A
significantly  negative  coefficient  on Excess-Finance  would  indicate  that  a financial  sector
growing  beyond  the legal infrastructure  is damaging  for firms' growth.
The results  in Table 14 provide  support  for the law and finance  view. We report  only the
coefficient  on the fitted  values  of our indicators  of financial  development  and on the respective
Excess-Finance.  The results  in the top panel  indicate  that firms  are more  likely  to grow  at rates
requiring  external  finance  in economies  in which the legal system  is conducive  to the
development  of large, active  and efficient  banks and  stock  markets.  With the exception  of
Finance-Size  all predicted  indicators  of financial  development  enter significantly  positive. None
of the Excess-Finance  variables  enters  significantly  in the regressions. The results  in the bottom
panel  are even  stronger.  All indicators  of predicted  financial  development  enter significantly
positive  in the regressions,  while  none  of the Excess-Finance  indicators  does. This indicates  that
the share  of firms  that  grow at rates  requiring  external  long-term  financing  is higher  in
economies  with a contracting  environment  that favors  financial  development.
5.4. Sensitivity  Analysis
We confirm  our main findings  using a larger  sample  of 38 countries,  some of which  are
not included  in the 48-country  sample  of this paper.' 5 While  firms  grow  at rates  requiring
15  Results available on request.
36external  financing  in economies  with higher  level of financial  development  and economies  with
better  protection  of outside  investors,  financial  structure  and financial  development  beyond  the
component  predicted  by the legal system  does  not  have any explanatory  power  for firms' growth.
Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (2000)  take  a different  approach  to test the law and
finance  view. Specifically  they  allow banking  sector  and stock  market  development  to take
different  coefficients.  In the first stage  they  regress  an indicator  of banking  sector  development
on Rule of Law,  the Common  legal origin  dummy,  Creditor  and the inflation  rate, and  an
indicator  of stock  market  development  on Rule  of Law,  the Common  legal origin  dummy,  Anti-
Director  and the inflation  rate.  They show  that while  the predicted  level of banking  sector  and
stock  market  development  can explain  the share  of firms  that grow  at rates  requiring  external
financing,  the residuals  from the first-stage  regressions  do not have  any explanatory  power. In
the regressions  of LTCOUNT  only the predicted  level of stock market  development  enters
significantly,  while the predicted  level of banking  sector  development  does  not enter
significantly.  Again,  the residuals  from  the first-stage  regressions  do not have  any explanatory
power. This indicates  that any  financial  development  beyond  the level  predicted  by the
macroeconomic  environment  and the legal  system  cannot  explain  firms' growth.
5.5. Summary
Using  firm-level  data we confirm  our previous  findings. Financial  structure  does not
explain  the growth  of firms  beyond  the rates  predicted  by the internal  resources  and short-term
borrowings.  This is inconsistent  with both the market-  and the bank-based  view. The share  of
firms  that  grow  at rates  requiring  external  financing  is higher  in countries  in countries  with
higher  levels of financial  sector  development,  which  is consistent  with the financial-services
37view.  Furthermore,  we find that firms  are more  likely  to grow  at rates  that require  external
finance  in countries  in which  the contracting  environment  favors  financial  sector development.
Financial  sector  development  beyond  the level that  is predicted  by the legal system  does not have
any explanatory  power  for firms' growth. This is consistent  with the law and finance  view.
6. Conclusions
This  paper  explored  the relationship  between  financial  structure  - the degree  to which  a
financial  system  is market-  or bank-based  - and economic  development.  We use three
methodologies.  The cross-country  approach  uses cross-country  data  to assess  whether
economies  grow  faster  with market-  or bank-based  financial  systems. The industry  approach
uses  a country-industry  panel to assess  whether  industries  that depend  heavily  on external
financing  grow  faster  in market-  or bank-based  financial  systems,  and  whether  financial  structure
influences  the rate of new firm creation. Finally,  the firm level approach  uses  firm-level  data
across  a broad  selection  of countries  to test whether  firms  are more  likely  to grow  beyond  the
rate  predicted  by internal  resources  and short-term  borrowings  in market-  or bank-based  financial
systems.
The cross-country  regressions,  the industry  panel  estimations  and the firm-level  analyses
provide  remarkably  consistent  conclusions.:  (i) financial  structure  is not an analytically  useful
way  to distinguish  financial  systems;  (ii) financial  structure  does  not help  in understanding
economic  growth,  industrial  performance,  or firm  expansion;  and (iii)  the results  are inconsistent
with both the market-based  and bank-based  views. More  precisely,  countries  do not grow  faster,
financially  dependent  industries  do not expand  at higher  rates,  new firms  are not created  more
38easily,  firms' access  to external  finance  is not higher,  and  firms  do not grow  faster  in either
market-  or bank-based  financial  systems.
We do find overwhelming  evidence  that the overall  level of financial  development  and
the legal environment  in which  financial  intermediaries  and  markets  critically  influence
economic  development.  Economies  grow  faster,  industries  depending  heavily  on external
finance  expand  at higher  rates,  new  firms  are created  more  easily,  firms' access  to external
financing  is higher,  and  firms  grow  more  rapidly  in economies  with a higher  levels  of overall
financial  sector  development  and in countries  with  legal  systems  that more  effectively  protect  the
rights  of outside  investors.  This is consistent  with both  the financial  services  and the law and
finance  views.
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Finance-  Finance-  Finance-  Finance-  Finance-  Structure  Structure  Structure  Structure  Structure  Creditor  Anti-  Rule of
Activity  Size  Efficiency  Aggregate Dummy  Activity  Size  Efficiency  Aggregate Dummy  Director  Law
Mean  -3.84  -0.39  0.37  0.00  0.54  -2.00  -0.64  -6.48  0.00  0.50  2.12  3.10  4.03
Median  -4.05  -0.39  0.22  -0.13  1.00  -2.05  -0.58  -6.38  0.15  0.50  2.00  3.00  4.00
Standard  Deviation  2.07  0.72  1.80  1.00  0.50  1.16  0.76  1.42  1.00  0.51  1.35  1.28  1.61
Maximum  0.55  0.91  4.43  1.88  1.00  0.59  1.34  -3.03  1.86  1.00  4.00  5.00  6.00
Minimum  -9.07  -1.88  -2.71  -2.20  0.00  -5.17  -2.46  -9.98  -2.75  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.14
Observations  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  41  41  48
Correlations
Finance-  Finance-  Finance-  Finance-  Finance-  Structure  Structure  Structure  Structure  Structure  Creditor  Anti-  Rule of
Activity  Size  Efficiency  Aggregate Dummy  Activity  Size  Efficiency  Aggregate  Dummy  Director  Law
Finance-  1
Activity
Finance-  0.881  1
Size  (0.001)
Finance-  0.942  0.800  1
Efficiency  (0.001)  (0.001)
Finance-  0.984  0.932  0.956  1
Aggregate  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Finance-  0.690  0.802  0.654  0.746  1
Dummy  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Structure-  0.689  0.347  0.730  0.618  0.172  1
Activity  (0.001)  (0.016)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.244)
Structure-  0.078  0.037  0.163  0.097  -0.190  0.544  1
Size  (0.599)  (0.803)  (0.269)  (0.512)  (0.196)  (0.001)
Structure-  0.796  0.513  0.675  0.693  0.306  0.862  0.298  1
Efficiency  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.034)  (0.001)  (0.040)
Structure-  0.655  0.375  0.651  0.588  0.142  0.966  0.675  0.884  1
Aggregate  (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.001)  0.3357  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Structure-  0.518  0.331  0.568  0.495  0.167  0.776  0.607  0.630  0.791  1
Dummy  (0.001)  (0.022)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.256)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Creditor  -0.070  0.026  0.010  -0.012  -0.067  -0.161  0.054  -0.193  -0.136  :0.136  1
(0.663)  (0.874)  (0.949)  (0.942)  (0.678)  (0.316)  (0.738)  (0.227)  (0.398)  (0.398)
Anti-  0.167  0.246  0.173  0.203  0.224  0.154  0.379  0.091  0.226  0.072  0.095  1
Director  (0.297)  (0.122)  (0.279)  (0.202)  (0.160)  (0.338)  (0.015)  (0.570)  (0.156)  (0.656)  (0.557)
Ruleof  0.704  0.692  0.649  0.712  0.564  0.330  -0.130  0.454  0.291  0.208  -0.116  -0.084  1
Law  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.022)  (0.377)  (0.001)  (0.045)  (0.157)  (0.470)  (0.602)Table 2: Financial Structure Across Countries
Structure-Activity  Structure-Size  Structure-Efficiency  Structure-Aggregate  Structure-Dummy
Taiwan  0.59  Ghana  1.34  Switzerland  -3.03  Taiwan  1.86  Australia  I
Malaysia  -0.32  South  Africa  0.94  Taiwan  -3.62  Malaysia  1.59  Brazil  1
Switzerland  -0.39  Malaysia  0.60  United  States  -4.38  Switzerland  1.58  Canada
United  States  -0.64  Jamaica  0.08  United  Kingdom  -4.79  United  States  1.34  Denmark  1
Ireland  -0.64  Zimbabwe  0.03  Brazil  -4.87  United  Kingdom  1.24  Germany  1
Turkey  -0.73  United  Kingdom  0.02  Malaysia  -4.97  Brazil  1.01  Ghana  1
United  Kingdom  -0.74  Mexico  -0.02  Israel  -5.10  Mexico  0.90  Ireland  1
Mexico  -0.85  New  Zealand  -0.02  Japan  -5.24  Japan  0.86  Israel
Brazil  -0.92  Ireland  -0.03  Germany  -5.26  South  Africa  0.85  Jamaica  1
Thailand  -0.92  Chile  -0.03  Sweden  -5.47  Canada  0.82  Japan
Japan  -1.00  Canada  -0.06  Thailand  -5.52  Sweden  0.80  Malaysia
Canada  -1.14  Peru  -0.07  Turkey  -5.54  Australia  0.80  Mexico  1
Israel  -1.15  Australia  -0.09  Australia  -5.58  Israel  0.75  Netherlands  I
Sweden  -1.18  Philippines  -0.10  Canada  -5.59  Turkey  0.71  New  Zealand  1
Australia  -1.18  United  States  -0.11  France  -5.60  Thailand  0.68  Peru  1
Netherlands  -1.36  Sweden  -0.15  Mexico  -5.75  Philippines  0.58  Philippines  1
Philippines  -1.47  Brazil  -0.31  South  Africa  -5.91  New  Zealand  0.49  South  Africa  I
Gemmany  -1.52  Japan  -0.35  Philippines  -5.92  Peru  0.39  Sweden  1
Peru  -1.54  Belgium  -0.36  Denmark  -6.08  Jamaica  0.38  Switzerland  1
India  -1.61  Sri Lanka  -0.39  New  Zealand  -6.12  Ireland  0.33  Taiwan  1
New  Zealand  -1.64  Ecuador  -0.43  Jamaica  -6.12  Netherlands  0.33  Thailand  I
Denmark  -1.87  Kenya  -0.48  Spain  -6.14  Germany  0.17  Turkey  I
South  Afrca  -1.90  Taiwan  -0.53  Netherlands  -6.26  Denmark  0.17  United  Kingdom  I
Jamaica  -2.04  Israel  -0.56  Argentina  -6.28  Ghana  0.16  United  States  I
Norway  -2.06  Netherlands  -0.60  Norway  -6.49  India  0.14  Argentina  0
Argentina  -2.15  India  -0.60  Peru  -6.53  Chile  0.00  Austria  0
Ghana  -2.17  Denmark  -0.62  Italy  -6.54  Ecuador  -0.04  Belgium  0
Ecuador  -2.19  Thailand  -0.66  India  -6.58  Belgium  -0.17  Chile  0
France  -2.28  Switzerland  -0.71  Ecuador  -6.65  France  -0.17  Colombia  0
Honduras  -2.34  Turkey  -0.74  Chile  -6.74  Argentina  -0.18  Cyprus  0
Spain  -2.36  Colombia  -0.78  Austria  -6.92  Norway  -0.23  Ecuador  0
Belgium  -2.38  Pakistan  -0.98  Belgium  -6.94  Spain  -0.31  Egypt  0
Chile  -2.46  Trinidad  and Tobago -1.00  Honduras  -7.06  Zimbabwe  -0.35  Finland  0
Pakistan  -2.51  Greece  -1.02  Finland  -7.23  Sri Lanka  -0.41  France  0
Italy  -2.52  Argentina  -1.09  Cyprus  -7.31  Italy  -0.55  Greece  0
Zimbabwe  -2.58  Cyprus  -1.11  Sri Lanka  -7.37  Pakistan  -0.62  Honduras  0
Greece  -2.65  Norway  -1.15  Greece  -7.37  Honduras  -0.63  India  0
Sri Lanka  -2.66  Finland  -1.29  Pakistan  -7.47  Greece  -0.66  Italy  0
Finland  -2.72  Spain  -1.29  Colombia  -7.50  Colombia  -0.75  Kenya  0
Austria  -3.04  France  -1.42  Portugal  -7.52  Finland  -0.76  Norway  0
Colombia  -3.04  Italy  -1.45  Trinidad  and Tobago -7.72  Trinidad  and Tobago -1.04-  Pakistan  0
Portugal  -3.40  Honduras  -1.46  Zimbabwe  -7.88  Cyprus  -1.05  Panama  0
Trinidad  and Tobago -3.41  Germany  -1.53  Ireland  -8.02  Austria  -1.27  Portugal  0
Cyprus  -3.62  Egypt  -1.54  Ghana  -8.52  Kenya  -1.37  Spain  0
Kenya  -3.93  Tunisia  -1.91  Kenya  -8.88  Portugal  -1.43  Sri Lanka  0
Egypt  -4.14  Panama  -1.94  Tunisia  -8.90  Egypt  -2.09  Trinidad  and  Tobago 0
Tunisia  -4.29  Portugal  -2.10  Egypt  -9.60  Tunisia  -2.09  Tunisia  0
Panama  -5.17  Austria  -2.46  Panama  -9.98  Panama  -2.75  Zimbabwe  0Table 3: Financial  Structure, Financial Development  and Economic Growth, OLS Regressions
Dependent  variable:  Real  per  Capita  GDP  Groowth,  1980-95











Finance-Activity  0.517  0.665  0.751  0.818  0.745
(0.158)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.005)
;  _  _  0.388  0.428  0.399  0.407  0.420
The  dependent  variable  is the average  growth  rate  of real  per capita  GDP,  calculated  as regression  coefficient.
All regressions  include  the policy  conditioning  information  set: logarithm  of initial income,  schooling,  inflation,  black  market  premium,
govemment  size and trade openness.  All regressions  are  estimated  using OLS.
Structure-Activity  = log(Total  value traded  divided  by  claims  on private  sector  by commercials  banks)
Structure-Size  = log(Market  capitalization  divided  by  claims  on private  sector  by commercials  bank)
Structure-Efficiency  = log(Total  value  traded  as share  of GDP ' Banks'  overhead  costs  as  share  of total assets)
Structure-Aggregate  - First  principal  components  of Structure-Activity,  Structure-Size  and Structure-Efficiency
Structure-Dummy  = Dummy  variable  that takes  the value  1 if Structure-Aggregate  is above  the median,  0 otherwise
Finance-Activity  = log(Total  value  traded  as share  of  GDP ' Claims  on private  sector  by  financial  institutions  as  share  of GDP)Table  4: Financial  Structure  and  Economic  Growth,  Senitivity  Analysis
Dependent  variable:  Real  per  Capita  GDP  Growth,  1980-95
1.  Controlling  for Finance-Size
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value  R-
Variable  error  Squared
Structure-Activity  0.539  0.305  1.770  0.085  0.353
Structure-Size  -0.327  0.469  -0.697  0.490  0.290
Structure-Efficiency  0.377  0.281  1.343  0.187  0.319
Structure-Aggregate  0.436  0.332  1.312  0.197  0.310
Structure-Dummy  0.191  0.517  0.369  0.714  0.282
2. Controlling  for Finance-Efficiency
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value  R-
Variable  error  Squared
Structure-Activity  -0.346  0.355  -0.973  0.337  0.433
Structure-Size  -0.739  0.416  -1.775  0.084  0.474
Structure-Efficiency  -0.032  0.202  -0.159  0.875  0.424
Structure-Aggregate  -0.455  0.372  -1.222  0.229  0.442
Structure-Dummy  -1.390  0.612  -2.270  0.029  0.486
3. Controlling  for Finance-Aggregate
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value  R-
Variable  error  Squared
Structure-Activity  0.134  0.383  0.350  0.729  0.384
Structure-Size  -0.734  0.480  -1.529  0.134  0.429
Structure-Efficiency  -0.033  0.244  -0.135  0.894  0.382
Structure-Aggregate  -0.275  0.351  -0.783  0.439  0.388
Structure-Dummy  -0.937  0.585  -1.600  0.118  0.412
4. Controlling  for Finance-Dummy
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value  R-
Variable  error  Squared
Structure-Activity  0.329  0.248  1.325  0.193  0.428
Structure-Size  -0.174  0.459  -0.379  0.707  0.405
Structure-Efficiency  0.188  0.229  0.822  0.416  0.413
Structure-Aggregate  0.213  0.269  0.792  0.433  0.410
Structure-Dummy  -0.054  0.465  -0.116  0.908  0.402
The  dependent  variable  is the  average  growth  rate  of  real  per  capita  GDP,  calculated  as  regression  coefficient.
All regressions  include  the  policy  conditioning  information  set:  logarithm  of initial  income,  schooling,  inflation,  black  market  premium,
govemment  size  and  trade  openness.  All regressions  are  estimated  using  OLS.
Structure-Activity  = log(Total  value  traded  divided  by claims  on  prvate  sector  by  commercials  banks)
Structure-Size  = log(Market  capitalization  divided  by  claims  on private  sector  by commercials  bank)
Structure-Efficiency  = log(Total  value  traded  as  share  of  GDP  * banks'  overhead  costs  as  share  of total  assets)
Structure-Aggregate  = First  principal  components  of  Structure-Activity.  Structure-Size  and  Structure-Efficiency
Structure-Dummy  = Dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  1  if Structure-Aggregate  is above  the  median,  0 otherwiseTable  5: Financial  Development  and  Economic  Growth
Dependent  variable:  Real  per  Capita  GDP  Growth,  1980-95
1. OLS Regressions
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value  R-
Variable  error  Squared
Finance-Activity  0.517  0.193  2.684  0.011  0.388
Finance-Size  0.885  0.796  1.113  0.273  0.280
Finance-Efficiency  0.582  0.186  3.127  0.003  0.424
Finance-Aggregate  1.070  0.427  2.507  0.016  0.382
Finance-Dummy  1.882  0.736  2.559  0.014  0.401
2. IV Regressions
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value  N*J
Variable  error  Statistic
Finance-Activity  0.630  0.282  2.232  0.031  2.141
Finance-Size  1.725  1.206  1.430  0.160  3.286
Finance-Efficiency  0.752  0.291  2.586  0.014  1.652
Finance-Aggregate  1.336  0.616  2.169  0.036  2.272
The  dependent  variable is  the average  growth rate of real per capita GOP,  calculated  as regression  coefficient.
All regressions  include the policy  conditioning  information  set: logarithm  of initial income, schooling,  inflation,  black market  premium,
govemment  size and trade openness.
Finance-Activity  = log(Total  value  traded as share of GOP  * Claims  on private  sector by  financial institutions  as share of GDP)
Finance-Size  = log(Market  capitalization  and claims  on private sector by  financial institutions  as share of GDP)
Finance-Efficiency  = log(Total  value traded  as share of GDP divided by Banks'  overhead  costs as share ot total assets)
Finance-Aggregate  = First principal  component  of Finance-Activity,  Finance-Size  and Finance-Efficiency
Finance-Dummy  = takes value 0 if claims  on private  sector  by banks as  share of GDP
and Value  traded as share of GDP are less than sample mean. 1 otherwiseTable  6: Financial  Development  and Economic  Growth:  The Legal-Based  View
Dependent  variable:  Real  per  Capita  GDP  Growth,  1980-95
1.  Policy  Conditioning  Information  Set
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value  N*J
Variable  error  Statistic
Finance-Activity  0.747  0.348  2.144  0.040  0.814
Finance-Size  1.653  0.717  2.307  0.028  1.468
Finance-Efficiency  0.692  0.340  2.034  0.050  0.913
Finance-Aggregate  1.255  0.559  2.246  0.032  1.102
2. Full  Conditioning  Information  Set
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value  N*J
Variable  error  Statistic
Finance-Activity  0.970  0.277  3.498  0.002  0.329
Finance-Size  2.282  0.699  3.266  0.003  2.122
Finance-Efficiency  0.878  0.311  2.827  0.008  0.729
Finance-Aggregate  1.757  0.521  3.373  0.002  0.931
Note:  N*J-Statistic  is disinbuted  Chi-Squared  with  two  degrees  of  freedom.
At the  10%  level,  the  critical  value  is  4.61. At  the  5%  level,  the  critical  value  is 5.99.
The  dependent  variable  is  the  average  growth  rate  of  real  per  capita  GDP,  calculated  as  regression  coefficient.
Policy  conditioning  information  set:  simple  set,  plus  inflation,  black  market  premium,  government  size  and  trade  openness.
Full  conditioning  information  set:  policy  set,  plus  a measure  of ethnic  fractionalization,  revolutions  and coups  and  political  assassinations.
We  use  Creditor,  Anti-Director  and  Rule  of Law  as  instruments  for  financial  development.
Finance-Activity  = log(Total  value  traded  as  share  of GDP  * Claims  on  private  sector  by  financial  institutions  as  share  of  GDP)
Finance-Size  = log(Market  capitalization  and  claims  on private  sector  by  financial  institutions  as  share  of  GDP)
Finance-Efficiency  = log(Total  value  traded  as  share  of GDP  divided  by  Banks'  overhead  costs  as  share  ot  total  assets)
Finance-Aggregate  = First  principal  component  of Finance-Activity,  Finance-Size  and  Finance-EfficiencyTable  7: Financial Structure  and Industry  Growth
Dependent variable: Industry Growth,  1980-89
OLS  Regressions
Structure-Activity  Structure-Size  Structure-Aggregate  Structure-Dummy
Interaction (extemal  dependence  0.887
x Structure-Activity)  (0.033)
Interaction (extemal dependence  0.698
x Structure-Size)  (0.144)
Interaction (extemal dependence  0.914
x Structure-Aggregate  )  (0.046)
Interaction (extemal dependence  1.101
x Structure-Dummy)  (0.233)
R2  0.311  0.309  0.310  0.309
Number of observations  1016  1016  1016  1016
IV Regressions
___________________________Structure-Activity  Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (extemal dependence  1.407
x Structure-Activity)  (0.064)
Interaction (extemal dependence  1.119
x Structure-Size)  (0.246)
Interaction (extemal dependence  1.415
x Structure-Aggregate  )  (0.121)
Number of observations  1016  1016  1016
The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added  for 1980-90 for each industry in each country.
The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions also include the industry's
share of total value added in manufacturing  in 1980. We use the British, French and German legal origin dummies as instruments
for financial structure in the IV regressions.
Structure-Activity = log(Total value traded divided by claims on private sector by commercials banks)
Structure-Size = log(Market capitalization divided by claims on private sector by commercials bank)
Structure-Aggregate  = First principal components of Structure-Activity and  Structure-Size
Structure-Dummy = Dummy variable that takes the value I if Structure-Aggregate is above the median, 0 otherwiseTable 8:  Financial Development,  Financial Structure, and Industry Growth
Dependent  variable: Industry  Growth, 1980-89
Structure-Activity  Structure-Size  Structure-Aggregate
Interaction  (external  dependence  -1.314
x Structure-Activity)  (0.308)
Interaction  (extemal  dependence  -0.103
x Structure-Size)  (0.892)
Interaction  (extemal  dependence  -0.416
x Structure-Aggregate  )  (0.640)
Interaction  (external  dependence  1.350  0.719  0.842
x Finance-Activity)  (0.033)  (0.018)  (0.022)
Number  of observations  1016  1016  1016
Structure-Activity  Structure-Size  Structure-Aggregate
Interaction  (extemal  dependence  -0.868
x Structure-Activity)  (0.435)
Interaction  (external  dependence  -0.175
x Structure-Size)  (0.825)
Interaction  (extemal  dependence  -0.441
x Structure-Aggregate  )  (0.628)
Interaction  (external  dependence  3.659  2.494  2.843
x Finance-Size)  (0.029)  (0.010)  (0.014)
Number  of observations  1016  1016  1016
_Structure-Activity  Structure-Size  Structure-Aggregate
Interaction  (external  dependence  -1.137
x Structure-Activity)  (0.346)
Interaction  (extemal  dependence  -0.151
x Structure-Size)  (0.845)
Interaction  (external  dependence  -0.461
x Structure-Aggregate  )  (0.609)
Interaction  (extemal  dependence  2.742  1.629  1.899
x Finance-Aggregate)  (0.029)  (0.013)  (0.016)
Number  of observations  1016  1016  1016
The dependent variable  is the annual  compounded  growth  rate in real value added for  1980-90  for each  industry  in each country.
The p-values for  heteroskedasticity  robust standard  errors  are reported  in parentheses.  All regressions  also  include  the industry's
share  of total value added in manufacturing  in 1980. All regressions  are IV. We  use the British, French  and German  legal origin
dummies and the share of Catholic, Muslim  and Protestant population  in total population  as instruments  for financial  development
and financial  structure.
Finance-Activity  = log(Total value traded  as share of GDP  ' Claims on private  sector by financial  institutions as share  of GDP)
Finance-Size  = log(Market capitalization  and claims on private  sector by financial  institutions as share  of GDP)
Finance-Aggregate  = First  principal component  of  Finance-Activity  and Finance-Size
Structure-Activity  = log(Total value traded  divided  by claims  on private sector  by commercials  banks)
Structure-Size  = log(Market  capitalization  divided  by claims  on private sector by commercials  bank)
Structure-Aggregate  = First  principal components  of  Structure-Activity  and Structure-SizeTable  9:  Financial  Development,  Financial  Structure,  and the Growth  in Number  of Firms
Dependent  variable: Growth  in the Number  of Firms,  1980-89
|  Structure-Activity  Structure-Size  Structure-Aggregate
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.127
x Structure-Activity)  (0.905)
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.729
x Structure-Size)  (0.310)
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.571
x Structure-Aggregate  )  (0.474)
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.659  0.572  0.521
x Finance-Activity)  (0.227)  (0.015)  (0.092)
Number  of observations  903  903  903
Structure-Activity  Structure-Size  Structure-Aggregate
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.275
x Structure-Activity)  (0.748)
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.786
x Structure-Size)  (0.282)
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.609
x Structure-Aggregate  )  (0.427)
Interaction  (external  dependence  1.969  1.914  1.746
x Finance-Size)  (0.169)  (0.014)  (0.074)
Number  of observations  903  903  903
Structure-Activity  Structure-Size  Structure-Aggregate
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.179
x Structure-Activity)  (0.852)
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.747
x Structure-Size)  (0.302)
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.574
x Structure-Aggregate  )  (0.465)
Interaction  (external  dependence  1.400  1.268  1.163
x Finance-Aggregate)  (0.193)  (0.014)  (0.081)
Number  of observations  903  903  903
The dependent variable  is the log difference  between the number of establishments  in 1990 and  1980 for  each industry  in each  country.
The p-values  for  heteroskedasticity  robust standard  errors are  reported in parentheses.  All regressions  also  include  the  industry's
share of total value added in manufacturing  in 1980. All  regressions  are IV. We use the British, French  and German  legal origin
dummies and the share of Catholic, Muslim and  Protestant population in total population  as instnuments for  financial development
and  financial  structure.
Finance-Activity  = log(Total value traded  as share  of GDP '  Claims on private sector  by financial  institutions as share  of GDP)
Finance-Sie  = log(Market capitalization  and daims  on private sector by financial  institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Aggregate  = First principal component  of Finance-Activity  and Finance-Size
Structure-Activity  = log(Total value traded  divided  by claims  on private  sector by commercials  banks)
Structure-Size  = log(Market capitalization divided  by claims  on private sector by commercials  bank)
Structure-Aggregate  = First principal components  of Structure-Activity  and  Structure-SizeTable 10: Financial  Structure,  the Legal Environment,  and Industry  Growth
Dependent  variable:  Industry  Growth,  1980-89
Structure-Activity  Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction  (external  dependence  -1.494
x Structure-Activity)  (0.124)
Interaction  (external  dependence  -0.543
x Structure-Size)  (0.695)
Interaction  (external  dependence  -1.651
x Structure-Aggregate  )  (0.243)
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.229  0.300  0.181
x Creditor)  (0.687)  (0.614)  (0.756)
Interaction  (external  dependence  1.327  0.598  1.455
x Anti-Director)  (0.078)  (0.594)  (0.178)
Interaction  (external  dependence  1.179  0.818  1.059
x Rule  of Law)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
F-test  Creditor,  Anti-Director  and  4.77  4.95  4.92
Rule  of Law  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)
Number  of observations  1016  1016  1016
Dependent  variable: Growth  in the Number  of Firms, 1980-89
Structure-Activity  Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction  (external  dependence  -0.858
x Structure-Activity)  (0.329)
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.104
x Structure-Size)  (0.926)
Interaction  (external  dependence  -0.564
x Structure-Aggregate  )  (0.650)
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.749  0.788  0.749
x Creditor)  (0.138)  (0.118)  (0.137)
Interaction  (extemal  dependence  1.175  0.440  0.928
x Anti-Director)  (0.126)  (0.069)  (0.343)
Interaction  (external  dependence  0.719  0.472  0.588
x Rule  of Law)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.024)
F-test  Creditor,  Anti-Director  and  2.49  3.05  2.39
Rule  of Law  (0.059)  (0.028)  (0.067)
Number  of observations  903  903  903
The dependent  variable  in the  top panel  is the annual  compounded  growth  rate in real  value  added  for 1980-90  for each industry  in each country.
The dependent variable  in the bottom  panel is the  log difference between  the number of establishments  in 1990 and 1980 for each  industry  in each country.
The p-values  for heteroskedasticity  robust  standard  errors are reported  in parentheses.  All regressions  also  include the  industry's
share  of total value added in manufacturing  in 1980. All regressions  are IV. We  use the Brtish,  French and German  legal origin
dummies and the share of Catholic, Muslim  and Protestant  population in total population  as instruments  for financial  structure
and the legal determinants.
Structure-Activity  = log(Total value traded  divided  by claims  on private  sector by commercials  banks)
Structure-Size  = log(Market capitalization  divided by claims on private sector by commercials  bank)
Structure-Aggregate  = First principal components  of Structure-Activity  and  Structure-Size
Creditor = index of  secured creditor  rights
Anti-director  = index of minority  shareholder  rights
Rule of Law = measure  of the law  and order  tradition  of a country.Table 11: Firm Growth Across Countries
Country  STCOUNT  LTCOUNT
Argentina  0.51  0.46
Australia  0.46  0.39
Austria  1.00  1.00
Belgium  0.45  0.38
Brazil  0.49  0.48
Canada  0.65  0.61
Chile  0.29  0.17
Colombia  0.33  0.33
Denmark  0.43  0.35
Finland  0.47  0.42
France  0.38  0.29
Germany  0.93  0.92
Great Britain  0.39  0.28
Greece  0.36  0.28
India  0.53  0.38
Ireland  0.64  0.55
Israel  0.58  0.46
Italy  0.41  0.35
Japan  0.43  0.36
Malaysia  0.54  0.49
Mexico  0.52  0.47
Netherlands  0.36  0.26
New  Zealand  0.26  0.23
Norway  0.46  0.41
Pakistan  0.46  0.32
Philippines  0.35  0.30
Portugal  0.40  0.36
South Africa  0.27  0.19
Spain  0.38  0.32
Sweden  0.46  0.38
Switzerland  0.33  0.28
Thailand  0.49  0.35
USA  0.44  0.39
STCOUNT  is the share of firns that grow faster  than predicted  by  the use of intemal resources.
LTCOUNT  is the share  of firms that grow faster  than predicted  by the use of intemal resources
and short-term  borrowings.
Data are  averaged  over  the period 1990-95.Table  12:  Financial  Structure  and  Firm  Growth
1.  Dependent  variable:  STCOUNT
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value Observations  Countries
Variable  error
Structure-Activity  -0.010  0.020  -0.479  0.632  172  33
Structure-Size  -0.091  0.024  -3.846  0.000  172  33
Structure-Efficiency  -0.014  0.017  -0.829  0.408  172  33
Structure-Aggregate  -0.031  0.018  -1.757  0.081  172  33
2.  Dependent  vafiable:  LTCOUNT
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value Observations  Countries
Variable  error
Structure-Activity  -0.010  0.021  -0.494  0.622  172  33
Structure-Size  -0.100  0.024  -4.098  0.000  172  33
Structure-Efficiency  -0.010  0.017  -0.566  0.572  172  33
Structure-Aggregate  -0.032  0.019  -1.738  0.084  172  33
STCOUNT  is the  share  of  firms  that  grow  faster  than  predicted  by  the  use  of  internal  resources.
LTCOUNT  is  the  share  of  firms  that  grow  faster  than  predicted  by  the  use  of  intemal  resources.
Conditioning  information  set level  and  growth  rate  of real  per  capita  GDP,  inflation  rate,
total  assets  of  firms  in a country  divided  by  GDP,  and  Rule  of  Law.
We use  the British,  German  and  French  legal  origin  as  instruments  for  financial  structure.
Structure-Activity  = log(Total  value  traded  divided  by  claims  on  private  sector  by  commercials  banks)
Structure-Size  = log(Market  capitalization  divided  by  claims  on private  sector  by  commercials  bank)
Structure-Efficiency  = log(Total  value  traded  as  share  of  GDP  * banks'  overhead  costs  as  share  of  total  assets)
Structure-Aggregate  = First  principal  components  of  Structure-Activity,  Structure-Size  and  Structure-EfficiencyTable  13:  Financial  Development  and  Firm  Growth
1.  Dependent  variable:  STCOUNT
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value Observations  Countries
Variable  error
Finance-Activity  0.056  0.025  2.219  0.028  172  33
Finance-Size  0.154  0.069  2.248  0.026  172  33
Finance-Efficiency  0.059  0.028  2.134  0.034  172  33
Finance-Aggregate  0.092  0.041  2.230  0.027  172  33
2.  Dependent  variable:  LTCOUNT
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value Observations  Countries
Variable  error
Finance-Activity  0.049  0.026  1.897  0.060  172  33
Finance-Size  0.143  0.070  2.029  0.044  172  33
Finance-Efficiency  0.048  0.029  1.661  0.099  172  33
Finance-Aggregate  0.080  0.043  1.887  0.061  172  33
STCOUNT  is the share of firms that grow faster than predicted  by the use of intemal resources.
LTCOUNT  is the share of firms that grow faster than  predicted  by the use  of intemal  resources.
Conditioning  information  set: level  and growth rate  of real per capita GDP,  inflation  rate,
total assets of firms in a country  divided by GOP, and Rule  of Law.
We use  the British,  German  and French  legal origin as instruments  for financial development.
Finance-Activity  = log(Total  value traded  as share  of GDP  * Claims  or  private  sector by  financial institutions  as share of GDP)
Finance-Size  = log(Market  capitalization  and daims on private  sector by financial institutions  as share of GDP)
Finance-Efficiency  = log(Total  value traded as share of GDP divided by Banks'  overhead  costs as share ot total assets)
Finance-Aggregate  = First  principal  component  of Finance-Activity,  Finance-Size  and Finance-EfficiencyTable 14: Firm Growth and the Legal-Based  View
1.  Dependent variable:  STCOUNT
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value  Observations Countries
Variable  error
Finance-Activity  0.057  0.029  1.998  0.046  172  33
Excess-Finance-Act.  0.013  0.017  0.760  0.447
Finance-Size  0.100  0.066  1.511  0.131  172  33
Excess-Finance-Size  -0.013  0.047  -0.283  0.778
Finance-Efficiency  0.074  0.033  2.236  0.025  172  33
Excess-Finance-Eff.  0.021  0.018  1.145  0.252
Finance-Aggregate  0.090  0.046  1.972  0.049  172  33
Excess-Finance-Aggr.  0.019  0.030  0.651  0.515
2. Dependent  variable:  LTCOUNT
Explanatory  coefficient  standard  t-statistic  P-value  Observations Countries
Variable  error
Finance-Activity  0.080  0.029  2.761  0.006  172  33
Excess-Finance-Act.  0.022  0.017  1.262  0.207
Finance-Size  0.150  0.067  2.227  0.026  172  33
Excess-Finance-Size  0.010  0.048  0.199  0.842
Finance-Efficiency  0.093  0.034  2.757  0.006  172  33
Excess-Finance-Eff.  0.025  0.018  1.371  0.170
Finance-Aggregate  0.123  0.046  2.665  0.008  172  33
Excess-Finance-Aggr.  0.033  0.030  1.094  0.274
STCOUNT  is the share of firms that grow faster than predicted  by the use of intemal  resources.
LTCOUNT  is the share of firms that grow faster than predicted  by the use of intemal  resources  .
All regressions  are estimated  using panel  data with random effects.
Conditioning  information  set: level and growth rate  of real per capita  GDP, inflation  rate,
total assets of firms in a country divided by GDP, and Rule  of Law.
Finance-Activity,  Size, Efficiency and Aggregate  are the predicted  values  from a regression of Finance-Activity,  Size, Efficiency
and Aggregate  on Creditor,  Anti-director  and Rule  of Law. Excess-Finance  are the residuals  from the respective  regression.
Finance-Activity  = log(Total  value traded as share of GDP  * Claims  on private sector by  financial institutions  as share of GDP)
Finance-Size  = log(Market  capitalization  and claims on private sector  by financial institutions  as share of GOP)
Finance-Efficiency  = log(Total  value traded as  share of GDP divided by Banks'  overhead costs as share ot total assets)
Finance-Aggregate  = First pnncipal component  of Finance-Activity,  Finance-Size  and Finance-EfficiencyTable Al:  Indicators of Financial Development,  Financial Structure  and the Legal System  Across Countries
Finance- Finance- Finance-  Finance-  Finance- Structure- Structure- Structure- Structure- Structure-
Country  Activity  Size  Efficiency  Aggregate Dummy  Activity  Size  Efficiency Aggregate Dummy  Anti-Director Creditor Rule  of Law Legal  origin
Argentina  -5.99  -1.62  -1.91  -1.39  0  -2.15  -1.09  -6.28  -0.18  0  4  1  3.21  F
Australia  -2.14  0.22  1.71  0.84  1  -1.18  -0.09  -5.58  0.80  1  4  1  6.00  E
Austria  -3.36  -0.06  0.48  0.26  1  -3.04  -2.46  -6.92  -1.27  0  2  3  6.00  G
Belgium  -4.37  -0.47  0.19  -0.16  0  -2.38  -0.36  -6.94  -0.17  0  0  2  6.00  F
Brazil  4.14  -1.01  -0.62  -0.53  0  -0.92  -0.31  -4.87  1.01  1  3  1  3.79  F
Canada  -2.14  0.20  1.84  0.86  1  -1.14  -0.06  -5.59  0.82  1  5  1  6.00  E
Chile  -3.96  -0.07  0.20  0.10  1  -2.46  -0.03  -6.74  0.00  0  5  2  4.21  F
Colombia  -6.31  -1.09  -2.51  -1.31  0  -3.04  -0.78  -7.50  -0.75  0  3  0  1.25  F
Cyprus  -4.44  -0.04  -1.06  -0.21  1  -3.62  -1.11  -7.31  -1.05  0  3.59  E
Denmark  -3.63  -0.45  0.58  0.05  0  -1.87  -0.62  -6.08  0.17  1  2  3  6.00  S
Ecuador  -5.75  -1.25  -1.52  -1.10  0  -2.19  -0.43  -6.65  -0.04  0  2  4  4.00  F
Egypt  -6.85  -1.11  -1.55  -1.23  0  -4.14  -1.54  -9.60  -2.09  0  2  4  2.50  F
Finland  -3.52  -0.16  0.98  0.28  1  -2.72  -1.29  -7.23  -0.76  0  3  1  6.00  S
France  -2.57  0.10  0.64  0.50  1  -2.28  -1.42  -5.60  -0.17  0  3  0  5.39  F
Germany  -1.76  0.10  1.91  0.89  1  -1.52  -1.53  -5.26  0.17  1  1  3  5.54  G
Ghana  -9.07  -1.88  -2.71  -2.20  0  -2.17  1.34  -8.52  0.16  1  2.00  E
Greece  -5.05  -0.73  -0.92  -0.62  0  -2.65  -1.02  -7.37  -0.66  0  2  1  3.71  F
Honduras  -5.15  -1.08  -0.76  -0.77  0  -2.34  -1.46  -7.06  -0.63  0  2.07  F
India  -4.35  -0.92  0.52  -0.30  0  -1.61  -0.60  -6.58  0.14  0  5  4  2.50  E
Ireland  -2.41  -0.11  4.14  1.11  1  -0.64  -0.03  -8.02  0.33  1  4  1  4.68  E
Israel  -2.52  -0.23  1.43  0.51  1  -1.15  -0.56  -5.10  0.75  1  3  4  2.89  E
Italy  -3.89  -0.47  0.13  -0.09  1  -2.52  -1.45  -6.54  -0.55  0  1  2  5.00  F
Jamaica  -4.82  -0.66  -0.96  -0.55  0  -2.04  0.08  -6.12  0.38  1  2.11  E
Japan  -0.43  0.88  3.32  1.76  1  -1.00  -0.35  -5.24  0.86  1  4  2  5.39  G
Kenya  -6.83  -0.90  -2.30  -1.27  0  -3.93  -0.48  -8.88  -1.37  0  3  4  3.25  E
Malaysia  -1.08  0.63  3.27  1.52  1  -0.32  0.60  -4.97  1.59  1  4  4  4.07  E
Mexico  -4.50  -1.13  0.23  -0.49  0  -0.85  -0.02  -5.75  0.90  1  1  0  3.21  F
Netherlands  -1.41  0.52  2.95  1.35  1  -1.36  -0.60  -6.26  0.33  1  2  2  6.00  F
New  Zealand  -3.14  -0.06  1.07  0.42  0  -1.64  -0.02  -6.12  0.49  1  4  3  6.00  E
Norway  -2.91  0.04  0.91  0.47  1  -2.06  -1.15  -6.49  -0.23  0  4  2  6.00  S
Pakistan  -5.41  -1.13  -0.45  -0.78  0  -2.51  -0.98  -7.47  -0.62  0  5  4  1.82  E
Panama  -6.55  -0.55  -1.76  -0.95  1  -5.17  -1.94  -9.98  -2.75  0  2.11  F
Pewu  -6.60  -1.84  -2.02  -1.62  0  -1.54  -0.07  -6.53  0.39  1  3  0  1.50  F
Philippines  -4.17  -0.69  0.03  -0.26  0  -1.47  -0.10  -5.92  0.58  1  3  0  1.64  F
Portugal  -4.32  -0.34  -0.19  -0.17  1  -3.40  -2.10  -7.52  -1.43  0  3  1  5.21  F
South Africa  -2.81  0.74  0.75  0.79  1  -1.90  0.94  -5.91  0.85  1  5  3  2.65  E
Spain  -3.11  -0.10  0.57  0.30  1  -2.36  -1.29  -6.14  -0.31  0  4  2  4.68  F
Sri Lanka  -5.97  -1.14  -1.26  -1.03  0  -2.66  -0.39  -7.37  -0.41  0  3  .3  1.14  E
Sweden  -1.91  0.39  1.49  0.92  1  -1.18  -0.15  -5.47  0.80  1  3  2  6.00  S
Switzerland  0.55  0.91  2.98  1.88  1  -0.39  -0.71  -3.03  1.58  1  2  1  6.00  G
Taiwan  0.31  0.34  4.43  1.84  1  0.59  -0.53  -3.62  1.86  1  3  2  5.11  S
Thailand  -1.98  -0.06  2.33  0.86  1  -0.92  -0.66  -5.52  0.68  1  2  3  3.75  EFinance- Finance- Finance-  Finance-  Finance- Structure- Structure- Structure-  Structure- Structure-
Country  Activity  Size  Efficiency  Aggregate Dummy  Activity  Size  Efficiency Aggregate Dummy  Anti-Director Creditor Rule  of Law Legal  origin
Trinidad  and Tobago  -5.32  -0.50  -1.52  -0.67  0  -3.41  -1.00  -7.72  -1.04  0  4.00  E
Tunisia  -5.52  -0.44  -1.00  -0.58  1  -4.29  -1 91  -8.90  -2.09  0  2.79  F
Turkey  -4.77  -1.61  -0.03  -0.81  0  -0.73  -0.74  -5.54  0.71  1  2  2  3.11  F
United  Kingdom  -1.33  0.41  2.72  1.27  1  -0.74  0.02  -4.79  1.24  1  5  4  5.14  E
United States  -0.80  0.64  2.24  1.37  1  -0.64  -0.11  -4.38  1.34  1  5  1  6.00  E
Zimbabwe  -6.14  -1.04  -1.37  -1.04  0  -2.58  0.03  -7.88  -0.35  0  3  4  2.21  E
Finance-Activity  =  log(Total  value  traded  as  share  of  GOP  ' Claims  on  private  sector  by  financial  instiutions  as  share  of  GDP)
Finance-Size  = log(Market  capitalization  and  cdaims  on  private  sector  by  financial  institutions  as share  of GDP)
Finance-Efficiency  = log(Total  value  traded  as share  of GDP divided  by Banks'  overhead  costs  as share  of total assets)
Finance-Aggregate  First  prncipal  component  of Finance-Activity,  Finance-Size  and  Finance-Efficiency
Finance-Dummy  = takes  value  0 if claims  on pnvate  sector  by banks  as share  of GDP and  Value  traded  as share  of GOP  are  less than  sample  mean, 1  otherwise
Structure-Activity  = log(Total  value  traded  divided  by daims on  private  sector  by commercials  banks)
Structure-Size  = log(Market  capitalization  dividecd  by daims  on private  sector  by commercials  bank)
Structure-Efficiency log(Total  value  traded  as share  of GDP  * Banks'  overhead  costs as share  of total assets)
Structure-Aggregate  = First  principal  components  of Structure-Activity,  Structure-Size  and  Structure-Efficiency
Structure-Dummy  = Dummy  vanable  that  takes  the  value  1 if Structure-Aggregate  is above  the  median,  0 otherwise
Creditor  = index  of secured  creditor  rghts
Anti-director  = index  of minority  shareholder  rghts
Rule of Law  = Measure  of the law  and order  tradition  of a country.
Legal  ongin:  E=Bdtish,  F=French,  G=German,  S=ScandinivaianTable  A2: External  Dependence  Across  Industries
External
ISIC  code  Industrial  Sector  dependence
314 Tobacco  -0.45
361 Pottery  -0.15
323 Leather  -0.14
3211 Spinning  -0.09
324 Footwear  -0.08
372 Nonferrous  metal  0.01
322 Apparel  0.03
353 Petroleum  refineries  0.04
369 Nonmetal  mineral  products  0.06
313 Beverages  0.08
371 Iron  and  steel  0.09
311 Food  products  0.14
3411 Pulp,  paper  0.15
3513 Synthetic  resins  0.16
341 Paper  and paper  products  0.18
342 Printing  and  publishing  0.20
352 Other  chemicals  0.22
355 Rubber  products  0.23
332 Furniture  0.24
381 Metal  products  0.24
3511 Basic  industrial  goods  excl.  fertilizers  0.25
331 Wood products  0.28
384 Transportation  equipment  0.31
354 Petroleum  and  coal  products  0.33
3843 Motor  vehicles  0.39
321 Textile  0.40
382 Machinery  0.45
3841 Ships  0.46
390 Other  industries  0.47
362 Glass  0.53
383 Electric  machinery  0.77
385 Professional  and scientific  goods  0.96
3832 Radios  1.04
3825 Office  and  computing  products  1.06
356 Plastic  products  1.14
3522 Drugs  1.49
External  dependence  is  defined  as capital  expenditures  (Compustat  # 128)  minus  cash flow
from  operations  divided  by capital  expenditures.  Cash  flow  from operations  is broadly  defined
as the sum  of Compustat  funds  from  operations(items  # 110),  decreases  in inventories,
decreases  in receivables,  and increases  in payables.
Source: Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998)Policy Research Working  Paper Series
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